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European Regulatory Private Law: The Transformation of European Private Law from 
Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation (ERPL) 
 
A 60 month European Research Council grant has been awarded to Prof. Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz  for 
the project “European Regulatory Private Law: the Transformation of European Private Law from 
Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation” (ERPL).  
The focus of the socio-legal project lies in the search for a normative model which could shape a self-
sufficient European private legal order in its interaction with national private law systems. The project 
aims at a new–orientation of the structures and methods of European private law based on its 
transformation from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation. It suggests the 
emergence of a self-sufficient European private law, composed of three different layers (1) the 
sectorial substance of ERPL, (2) the general principles – provisionally termed competitive contract 
law – and (3) common principles of civil law. It elaborates on the interaction between ERPL and 
national private law systems around four normative models: (1) intrusion and substitution, (2) conflict 
and resistance, (3) hybridisation and (4) convergence. It analyses the new order of values, enshrined in 
the concept of access justice (Zugangsgerechtigkeit). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under 
the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007–2013) / ERC Grant Agreement 
n. [269722]. 
  
Abstract 
The paper examines the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and it 
analyzes the role played by the European Union in the landscape of international finance. The aim is to 
test how far we can conceive of the EU as the heir to the traditional State rule-makers in the sphere of 
international financial soft-law. In order to do all this, we will first of all describe the historical context 
in which IOSCO was born, its legal nature, governance procedures and decision-making processes. 
Then, we will turn to look at the EU and its financial services law, its internal and external competence 
in order to understand the formal (and informal) role played by the EU in IOSCO. Finally, we will 
give an account of the quality and quantity of the implementation of IOSCO rules into EU Law of 
financial services. The result seems to suggest that the European Union is very likely to play an ever 
increasing role not only within IOSCO but also as a key actor on the global stage of international 
financial (soft-)law. 
Keywords 
IOSCO, financial regulation, transnational law, EU external relations, international financial 
architecture
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THE EU AND IOSCO: 
AN EVER CLOSER COOPERATION? 
Antonio Marcacci 
Introduction 
Setting the Stage: The End of Bretton Woods and the Spread of International Financial Markets 
The demise of the Bretton Woods Agreements in the early ‘70s brought about radical changes in 
international finance and, thus, in international financial law. It was the turning point with which we 
must start in order to describe the general economic and legal conditions which saw the birth of our 
current financial framework.  
 The Bretton Woods system was a financial and monetary system established by the Allied nations in 
July 1944 during the final phase of the Second World War.
1
 The most important feature of the Bretton 
Woods agreement was the setting up of a new international pegged-exchange system: all contracting 
Governments bound themselves to keep a monetary policy that maintain a fixed rate of their national 
currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar. In turn, the US dollar was itself pegged to gold. Furthermore, the 
Bretton Woods agreements also established two major international financial institutions: the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  
After having experienced the collapse of the gold-standard system, the catastrophic protectionist 
policies, the “beggar-thy-neighbor” devaluations and currency manipulations during the 1930s,2 the 
Allies (and the US in particular) sought to use goal to build regulated systems of currency exchanges 
and payments.
3
 Mostly because of the strength of the US economy, the new monetary system was 
based on the US dollar. 
Although, on the one hand, the Bretton Woods Agreements were aimed at stabilizing the exchange 
rates between nation-states’ currencies, on the other hand, the Conference members were also aware of 
the necessity to leave some margin for movements between currencies so a “crawling peg” exchange 
rate adjustment system was created. According to this regulatory framework, national currencies could 
vary within a band of +/-1% (which later became +/-1.5%, and then +/-2.5%) through periodic small 
changes in par value.
4
 The International Monetary Fund, meanwhile, had the institutional goal of being 
the shock-absorber of international monetary imbalances through the management of its reserves of 
national currencies and gold. This system gave the nation-states the possibility to temporarily bankroll 
their balance of payments problems by buying foreign currency with its own national currency, but it 
was also supposed to tame inflationary drifts (and an excessive creation of liquidity) thanks to a series 
                                                     
1
 See: James, Harold (1996), International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods, Washington, DC, New York and 
Oxford.: IMF/Oxford University Press. 
2
 Ibid. At 32.  
3
 In the words of Catherine R. Schenk: “After 1945, the regulation of international financial markets became more intense 
and widespread as part of the system designed to avoid the chaos that had characterized international economic relations 
in the 1930s.” Schenk, Catherine R. (2010) "The regulation of international financial markets from the 1950s to the 
1990s" in Stefano Battilossi & Jaime Reis, eds. State and Financial Systems in Europe and the USA: Historical 
Perspectives on Regulation and Supervision in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Ashgate. At 221. 
4
 James, Harold (1996), International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods, Washington, DC, New York and 
Oxford.: IMF/Oxford University Press. At 213. 
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2 
of monetary obligations constraining the use of national currencies to buy foreign currencies.
5
 In such 
a system, cross-border operations were restricted by tight controls and the supply of US dollars, which 
was to represent the gauge of a new international liquidity, was supposed to be in the hands of the US 
monetary authorities.  
After the very stiff and regulated Bretton Woods system was fully established, as of 1958
6
 a new 
phenomenon arose: that of the Eurodollars
7. These were “dollar deposits with, and dollar loans granted 
by, banks outside the United States”8. In this new market, first and foremost based in the City of 
London
9
 and populated by American financial institutions, banks accepted dollars from both banks 
and non-bank lenders and loaned dollars to other banks as well as to non-bank borrowers: “In the 
Eurodollar market, therefore, a deposit is usually transferred from a nonbank lender to a nonbank 
borrower along a chain of banks rather than by a single bank”.10 Most importantly for us, the 
Eurodollar market was deliberately designed to be beyond the reach of the Bretton Woods tight rules 
and it can be considered as the first unregulated
11
 international financial market: “It was on British 
soil, but eventually, many of its players were American. So neither country could unilaterally close it 
down”.12 The Eurodollars market grew very fast and deeply contributed to the expansion of the 
quantity of dollars kept abroad. 
After the ‘60s, the US increasingly had problems in coping with the requirements of the Bretton 
Woods Agreements. In particular, in 1971 the British, French, Swiss, and German monetary 
authorities made several choices
13
 that contributed to a deterioration in the US situation. This was 
characterized by a constant loss of gold accelerated by an increase of reserves of US dollars kept 
abroad
14
, and a chronic balance of payments deficit, mainly caused by the cost of the Vietnam War. 
Together these were the reasons that prompted the American decision to abandon the Bretton Woods 
agreements and direct the world towards a system of free fluctuations of currencies. On August 15
th
 
1971, the US President Richard Nixon announced the end of the convertibility of the US dollar to 
gold, thus putting an end to the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange rates system. 
Choosing to make the dollar irredeemable sine die brought with it the implied possibility of creating 
international liquidity to be used for exchanges and investments in international financial markets, 
without fearing inflationary pressures within the US.
15
 After a period of uncertainty, currencies started 
to be traded like any other commodities and their exchange rate was determined by the supply-demand 
                                                     
5
 Amato, Massimo & Luca Fantacci (2009), Fine della finanza: Donzelli Editore. At 171. 
6
 Ibid. At 130. 
7
 See: Einzig, Paul (1977), The Euro-dollar system: practice and theory of international interest rates: Macmillan. 
8
 Rich, George (1972) "A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Eurodollar Market," 4 Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 616-635. (3). At 616. 
9
 As reported by Altman: “The most important foreign markets for dollar deposits are in Montreal, Toronto, London, and a 
number of cities in continental Western Europe.” Altman, Oscar L. (1961) "Foreign Markets for Dollars, Sterling, and 
Other Currencies", 8, (3). At 313. 
10
 Rich, George (1972) "A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Eurodollar Market," 4 Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking 616-635. (3). 616. 
11
 Amato, Massimo & Luca Fantacci (2009), Fine della finanza: Donzelli Editore. At 131. 
12
 Rajan, Raghuram & Luigi Zingales (2003), Saving capitalism from the capitalists: Random House Business Books. At 
262.    
13
 In May 1971 the Bundesbank, the German Central Bank, found itself no longer able to maintain the Deutsche Mark’s peg 
to the US Dollar and, on May 5th 1971, the German Federal Government let the Deutsche Mark float. At this moment, 
other countries, like the UK, France and Switzerland, decided to redeem their dollars for gold: with a fixed rate of $35 
per ounce and an open market value between $40 and $58 per ounce, such a redemption would have meant great losses 
for the US. See: Jagerson, John & S. Wade Hansen (2011), All About Forex Trading: McGraw-Hill Professional. At 18. 
14
 See: Triffin, Robert (1960), Gold and the dollar crisis: the future of convertibility: Yale University Press. 
15
 Amato, Massimo & Luca Fantacci (2009), Fine della finanza: Donzelli Editore. At 130. 
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mechanism. In particular, in January 1976, the Jamaica Agreement signed by the IMF updated the 
IMF’s Articles of Agreement by accepting the free floating of currency rates16. The new Foreign 
Exchange Market was born and, like the Eurodollars market, was unregulated. 
Given this new economic context where huge amounts of capital can flow into and out of nation-states 
and “domestic securities markets are increasingly being integrated into a global market”17, during the 
‘70s we witness the transformation of the legal tools used to regulate international finance and the 
dawn of a new phenomenon, that of the transnational regulatory networks such
18
 as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), 
and the International Organization of Securities Commissions. 
1. The Global Standard Setter for Finance: The International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
a. The Birth of IOSCO: From a Pan-American Forum to a World Organization
19
 
Born in 1974 as a pan-American forum, IOSCO was originally named the “Inter-American 
Conference of Securities Commissions”20. Its first meeting was held in Caracas,21 Venezuela, in 
September 1974. The idea of holding this Conference originated with the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), the private sector lending arm of the World Bank Group which deals with 
developing countries, that provided the necessary funds.
22
 In 1971, indeed, the then president of the 
World Bank, the former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, decided to establish a “Financial 
Market” department within the IFC aimed at improving the financial infrastructure of developing 
countries.
23
 In the same period, the American federal regulator for securities markets, the Securities 
and Exchanges Commission, also set up its Office of International Affairs.
24
 The first jurisdictions to 
attend the Conference were Argentina, Brazil, Quebec, Ontario, Chile, the United States, Mexico, 
Panama and Venezuela and some non-American countries, such as the French Commission des 
Opérations en Bourse, took part as observers.
25
 During its first years, IOSCO operated in quite an 
                                                     
16
 Jagerson, John & S. Wade Hansen (2011), All About Forex Trading: McGraw-Hill Professional. At 21. 
17
 As per the Preamble of IOSCO By-Laws (See: International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2010c) 
"Resolution of the Presidents Committee on Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws to reflect change in structure," Madrid. 
Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES33.pdf.) 
18
 Zaring, David (1998) "International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory 
Organizations," 33 Texas International Law Journal 281-330. (2). At 282. 
19
 This section was previously analyzed by the author in: Marcacci, Antonio (2012) "IOSCO: The World Standard Setter for 
Globalized Financial Markets," 12 Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 23-43. (1). 
20
 Also called the “Inter-American Association of Securities Commissions” in  Sommer, A.A. Jr. (1996) "IOSCO: Its 
Mission and Achievement Symposium: Internationalization of Securities," 17 Northwestern Journal of International Law 
& Business 15-29. At 15.  
21
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2011a) "2010 IOSCO Annual Report",Madrid. Available 
at: http://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/2010/. At 49. 
22
 This information was reported by Mr. Irving M. Pollack, SEC commissioner from 1974 through 1980, to Dr. Regis 
Bismuth and published in Dr. Bismuth’s Ph.D. dissertation: Bismuth, Régis (2009) "La coopération internationale des 
autorités de régulation du secteur financier et le droit international public", University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. At 
207. 
23
 Ibid. At 207. 
24
 Ibid. At 207. 
25
 Ibid. At 207.  
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informal fashion, and a confirmation of this is the fact that the first Annual Report was adopted only in 
1988.
26
 
At the Quito Conference held in 1983, the “Inter-American Conference of Securities Commissions” 
became the “International Organization of Securities Commissions”, with France, Indonesia, Korea, 
and the United Kingdom becoming official members in 1984. As soon as it went global, IOSCO 
started accepting more and more members and this is clear by reading the list of signers of the so-
called “Rio Declaration”. On November 7th 1986, the Executive Committee adopted a Resolution 
Concerning Mutual Assistance (the so-called “Rio Declaration”) aimed at binding the signatory 
members “to provide assistance on a reciprocal basis for obtaining information related to market 
oversight and protection of each nation’s markets against fraudulent securities transactions.”27 This 
document, which is the oldest policy document published in the IOSCO official website, makes it 
evident how fast the organization was developing into an international body: many of its signatories 
were securities regulators from non-American jurisdictions, like the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (which signed on the 31
st
 October 1987), or the Italian Commissione 
Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (which signed on the 31
st
 March 1987). By 1994, IOSCO had 
amassed seventy ordinary members, nine associate members, and thirty-five affiliate members,
28
 
thereby covering eighty-five percent of the world’s securities markets.29  
Currently, IOSCO has 115 ordinary members (most of them are public financial market regulators), 
eleven associate members (often regulators other than those dealing with regulated capital markets), 
and seventy-five affiliate members (usually stock and futures exchanges or dealers associations) from 
all around the world.
 30
 It covers more than ninety-five percent of the world’s securities and futures 
markets,
31
 and it is not only the key global institution producing international standards for financial 
regulation,
32
 but it also has wider global responsibilities as one of the three members of the Joint 
Forum of international financial regulators, alongside the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, established in 1996. 
After looking at its evolution, we can conclude that IOSCO is not so much the successor of the Inter-
American Conference, as its continuum.
33
 And a formal, but very good, example of this conclusion is 
the fact that IOSCO annual meetings are numbered from the beginning of the Inter-American 
Association and not from the formal establishment of IOSCO itself, whose first meeting in Rio de 
Janeiro in was, indeed, called the Twelfth Annual Conference.
34
  
                                                     
26
 Sommer, A.A. Jr. (1996) "IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement Symposium: Internationalization of Securities," 17 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 15-29. At 16. 
27
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (1986) "A Resolution Concerning Mutual Assistance ("Rio 
Declaration")," Montreal. Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES1.pdf. 
28
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (1994) "IOSCO Annual Report 1994," Montreal. At 26-32. 
29
 Ibid. At 4. 
30
 See: https://www.iosco.org/lists/index.cfm?section=general   
31
 See: https://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background  
32
  Brummer, Chris (2010a) "Post-American Securities Regulation," 98 California Law Review 327. (2). 
33
 Sommer, A.A. Jr. (1996) "IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement Symposium: Internationalization of Securities," 17 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 15-29. At 16. 
34
 Ibid. At 16. 
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i. IOSCO’s controversial legal nature 
As regards the Organization’s legal nature, not even at the “founding” Ecuador Conference IOSCO 
was it endowed with any formal legal solution.
35
 At the Paris Conference of 1986, the first one held 
outside the Americas, it was decided to set up a permanent General Secretariat.
36
 However, it was only 
in 1987 that IOSCO was formally incorporated as a non-profit corporation under the Quebec law by an 
act
37
 of the Quebec Parliament,
38
 and its Secretariat was formally established in Montreal, an 
important financial center that had previously been one of the leading non-US markets for US dollar 
deposits.
39
 Even now IOSCO still has neither a charter nor a formal founding treaty
40
, but is governed 
by By-Laws passed by the organization members in 1984.
41
  
These By-Laws are, mutatis mutandis, the “Constitution” of IOSCO.42 They have been reformed over 
time
43
 and the last change took place in 2010. The document distinguishes the different nature of the 
members (ordinary, associate and affiliate – see below), it defines the structure of the organization (see 
below), the “statutory” establishment of the Annual Meetings and a system of “sanctions” that can be 
imposed upon members in case of “repeated failure to pay contributions”.44 Importantly, the By-Laws 
document does not specify the legal nature of IOSCO, but it more simply states that securities 
regulators have decided to come together in the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
in order to achieve some specific aims, such as cooperation and information sharing. 
If we look at the Quebecker Act of 1987, we find that it states that: “il est opportun de reconnaître à 
l'Organisation un statut de personne morale sans but lucrative”45. With Article 7 clarifying that: 
“L'Organisation possède la personnalité juridique; elle a notamment la capacité de contracter, 
d'acquérir et d'aliéner des biens ainsi que d'ester en justice.” Thus, IOSCO was established under the 
Quebecker Law as a Nonprofit Legal Person with all the rights and duties typical of such 
organizations. Importantly, the Quebecker Act does not tell us anything about IOSCO’s functioning, 
governance procedures or operational bodies since everything is left to the IOSCO By-Laws: “Sous 
                                                     
35
 Bismuth, Régis (2009) "La coopération internationale des autorités de régulation du secteur financier et le droit 
international public", University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. At 208.  
36
 See : https://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background  
37
 Loi concernant l'Organisation Internationale des Commissions de Valeurs, 1er Décembre 1987, Assemblée Nationale du 
Québec, 33e législature, 1re session, 1987, chapitre 143, Loi n° 243, Bulletin de l’Assemblée Nationale du Québec, 1987, 
2453-2456. 
38
 Sommer, A.A. Jr. (1996) "IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement Symposium: Internationalization of Securities," 17 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 15-29. At 16. 
39
 As regards the mention of the then most important financial centers, see: Altman, Oscar L. (1961) "Foreign Markets for 
Dollars, Sterling, and Other Currencies", 8, (3). At 313. 
40
 Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2000) "Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks" in Michael Byers, ed. 
Role of Law in International Politics. Oxford University Press. At 184. 
41
 Zaring, David (1998) "International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory 
Organizations," 33 Texas International Law Journal 281-330. (2). At 292. 
42
 Marcacci, Antonio (2012) "IOSCO: The World Standard Setter for Globalized Financial Markets," 12 Richmond Journal 
of Global Law and Business 23-43. (1). 
43
 As indicated in the Appendix to the Annex 1 of the latest available version of the IOSCO By-Laws [See: International 
Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2010c) "Resolution of the Presidents Committee on Amendment to 
IOSCO’s By-Laws to reflect change in structure," Madrid. Available at: 
http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES33.pdf.] an important reform of By-Laws occurred in 1996.   
44
 IOSCO By-Laws, Part 12,  Art. 77. See: ibid. At 20. 
45
 Préambule de la Loi concernant l'Organisation Internationale des Commissions de Valeurs, 1er Décembre 1987, 
Assemblée Nationale du Québec, 33e législature, 1re session, 1987, chapitre 143, Loi n° 243, Bulletin de l’Assemblée 
Nationale du Québec, 1987, 2453-2456. Article 1 restates that : “Une personne morale sans but lucratif est constituée 
sous la dénomination sociale «Organisation internationale des commissions de valeurs»”. 
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réserve de la présente loi, les statuts de l'Organisation internationale des commissions de valeurs en 
vigueur le 30 novembre 1987 continuent de régir l'Organisation jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient été modifiés, 
remplacés ou abrogés.”46  
In 1999 the headquarters of the IOSCO General Secretariat were moved to Madrid.
47
 With the 
Disposición Adicional Tercera. Régimen de la Organización Internacional de Comisiones de Valores 
of the act Ley 55/1999, de 29 de diciembre, de Medidas fiscales, administrativas y del orden social
48
 
adopted by the Spanish Parliament, IOSCO was incorporated under the Spanish Law. This Spanish 
Act acknowledges IOSCO as an asociación de utilidad pública and, by referring to Art. 4 de la Ley 
191/1964, de 24 de diciembre
49
, it clarifies that this means that IOSCO is deemed to be an association 
whose statutory aims are “de cooperación para el desarrollo” (cooperation for the development) and 
“de fomento de la economía social” (to nurture the social economy). It is further specified that IOSCO 
is a nonprofit entity (carecer de ánimo de lucro). 
Thus, nowadays IOSCO can be classified as multilateral regulatory network of (usually public) 
regulators with the formal structure of a private-law based nonprofit entity incorporated by a statutory 
act.  
ii. IOSCO’s “statutory” aims  
As regards its statutory goals, the Quebecker Act incorporating IOSCO stated that:  
“L'Organisation a pour objet de permettre à ses membres de mieux accomplir leur mission, et 
notamment d'échanger des informations en vue de développer les marchés de valeurs et 
d'améliorer leur fonctionnement, de coordonner les activités de ses membres et d'adopter ou de 
proposer l'adoption de normes communes.”50  
Thus, exchange of information in order to better develop financial markets, operational coordination 
and the adoption of common rules were the original goals of IOSCO. The Spanish Act, instead, does 
                                                     
46
 Article 8 de la Loi concernant l'Organisation Internationale des Commissions de Valeurs, 1er Décembre 1987, Assemblée 
Nationale du Québec, 33e législature, 1re session, 1987, chapitre 143, Loi n° 243, Bulletin de l’Assemblée Nationale du 
Québec, 1987, 2453-2456. The centrality of IOSCO By-Laws was acknoledged by the Quebecker Act in other 
articles: “Sont membres de l'Organisation, les commissions de valeurs et organismes similaires qui le 30 novembre 1987 
sont membres de l'Organisation internationale des commissions de valeurs et tout autre organisme qui le deviendra par 
la suite conformément aux statuts de l'Organisation” (Art. 3); “Les dirigeants et membres de comités de l'Organisation 
internationale des commissions de valeurs en fonction le 30 novembre 1987, le demeurent jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient été 
remplacés conformément aux statuts de l'Organisation” (Art. 5); “Le secrétaire général est désigné conformément aux 
statuts de l'Organisation. Il dirige le secrétariat général et prend les décisions nécessaires à son administration” (Art. 6). 
47
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (1999) "A Resolution on the Relocation of the IOSCO 
General Secretariat to Madrid," Montreal. Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES18.pdf. 
Alongside Madrid, other cities presented their candidature: Amsterdam, Basel, Frankfurt, London, Paris and Singapore. 
See: http://www.iimv.org/noticias/iosco1.htm. The raison why Madrid was chosen is linked to the generosity of the 
Spanish Government which was willing to provide the most attractive solution. See: Bismuth, Régis (2009) "La 
coopération internationale des autorités de régulation du secteur financier et le droit international public", University 
Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. At 231.  
48
 Ley 55/1999, de 29 de Diciembre, de Medidas fiscales, administrativas y del orden social, Boletìn Oficial del Estado, 30 
Diciembre 1999, n° 312, p. 46095, n° 24876. 
49
 Ley 191/1964, de 24 de Diciembre, de asociaciones , Boletìn Oficial del Estado, 28 Diciembre 1964, n° 311, p. 17334-
17336. 
50
 Art. 2, Loi concernant l'Organisation Internationale des Commissions de Valeurs, 1er Décembre 1987, Assemblée 
Nationale du Québec, 33e législature, 1re session, 1987, chapitre 143, Loi n° 243, Bulletin de l’Assemblée Nationale du 
Québec, 1987, 2453-2456. 
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not mention the Organization’s aims in details, but it simply refers to IOSCO as an asociación de 
utilidad pública.
51
  
After some changes occurred over the years, the Organization’s official goals are now defined in the 
2010 Resolution on IOSCO’s Mission, Goals and Priorities52 with which the Organization’s members 
officially declare themselves to be working: 
 “to cooperate in developing, implementing and promoting adherence to internationally 
recognized and consistent standards of regulation, oversight and enforcement in order to protect 
investors, maintain fair, efficient and transparent markets, and seek to address systemic risks”; 
 “to enhance investor protection and promote investor confidence in the integrity of securities 
markets, through strengthened information exchange and cooperation in enforcement against 
misconduct and in supervision of markets and market intermediaries”;  
 “to exchange information at both global and regional levels on their respective experiences in 
order to assist the development of markets, strengthen market infrastructure and implement 
appropriate regulation”.53 
It is also important to mention the so-called operational priorities. These are a set of temporary 
objectives established “in order to help focus common efforts and coordinate actions”54. These 
“operational priorities” can be seen as the organization’s mid-term policy aims, and they can be 
characterized as being much more detailed, more flexible and less formal than the statutory goals.
55
 
Quite recently, in 2010, a set of operational priorities for the period from 2010 to 2015 was adopted in 
order to adapt the IOSCO’s work to the post-crisis international financial environment. Indeed, the 
Presidents’ Committee stated that IOSCO was now to focus on three main operational priorities 
dealing with: the systemic risk issue, the implementation of IOSCO most important rules (Objectives 
and Principles and MMOU), and the role of IOSCO as a credible actor in the global financial scene.  
In particular, the first priority concerns how to “identify and seek to address systemic risks to the fair 
and efficient functioning of markets”56 and, with this in mind, a new Standing Committee on Risk and 
Research and a new Research Department were set up. The Standing Committee was formed in April 
2011 by the Executive Committee and is composed of experts from the financial regulators of the most 
important markets. The small Research Unit, whose first work on mitigating systemic risk was 
published as an IOSCO discussion paper in February 2011, will be turned into an independent 
                                                     
51
 Marcacci, Antonio (2012) "IOSCO: The World Standard Setter for Globalized Financial Markets," 12 Richmond Journal 
of Global Law and Business 23-43. (1). 
52
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2010e) "Resolution on IOSCO’s Mission, Goals and 
Priorities," Madrid Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES26.pdf. 
53
 Ibid. At 1-2.  
    The 2010 Annual Report also restates the Organization’s aims: “IOSCO aims to maintain and improve the international 
regulatory framework for securities markets via the setting of international standards; to identify and address systemic 
risks to the fair and efficient functioning of markets; as well as to strengthen our role within the international financial 
community in order to advance the implementation of the high-level IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation (IOSCO Principles).” International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2011a) "2010 IOSCO 
Annual Report",Madrid. Available at: http://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/2010/. At 4. 
54
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2010e) "Resolution on IOSCO’s Mission, Goals and 
Priorities," Madrid Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES26.pdf. At 2. 
55
 Marcacci, Antonio (2012) "IOSCO: The World Standard Setter for Globalized Financial Markets," 12 Richmond Journal 
of Global Law and Business 23-43. (1). 
56
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2010e) "Resolution on IOSCO’s Mission, Goals and 
Priorities," Madrid Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES26.pdf. At 2. On systemic risk, 
see also: International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2011a) "2010 IOSCO Annual Report",Madrid. 
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Research Department as of January 2012
57
. This Unit is to evolve by developing a network of external 
experts, gathering data, analyzing and producing reports that serve the IOSCO’s standards setting 
activities.
58
 The Research Unit is also tasked with preparing an Annual Global Securities Regulation 
Risk Outlook indicating the most significant financial systemic risks at a global level.
59
 As the 2010 
Annual Report states: “The standing committee and the research unit complement each other and work 
together where appropriate to maximize efficiency”.60 Finally, it saw the strengthening of the links 
between IOSCO, other international financial standard setters and other global bodies with missions 
complementary to that of IOSCO with the aim of improving the anti-systemic risk research activity
61
. 
The systemic risk issue is probably the most innovative priority and, indeed, represents a sign of the 
times in financial history.
62
 
The second priority deals with the necessity to “maintain and improve the international regulatory 
framework for securities markets via the setting of international standards”63 and, in order to do so, it 
was recommended to undertake a systematic and periodic review of the IOSCO Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation, the systematic implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and 
Principles, and the full implementation of the IOSCO MOU.
64
 
Finally, the third priority concerns the strengthening of “IOSCO’s role within the international 
financial community in order to advance the implementation of high-level objectives and principles of 
securities regulation”65 and, in his vein, there were suggestions made in favor of the promotion of 
IOSCO’s positions in relevant policy fora; and more proactive coordination with stakeholders, in 
particular with the investors and bodies representing the industry. Interestingly, IOSCO seems to be 
concerned with becoming more involved at global level not only vis-à-vis the financial industry, but 
also a propos investors. Unfortunately, the document does not specify whether it refers to institutional 
and professional investors or all investors, thus also including retail investors. However, it is very 
significant that the safeguarding of investors’ wellbeing has not only become, as we have seen above, 
a core object of IOSCO, but it has also developed into a temporary policy aim. 
b. The Governance of IOSCO  
The IOSCO By-Laws establish three different of membership: full, associate and affiliate members. In 
order to become a member of the Organization, a body must apply in writing to the Secretary General 
(Article 10 of the By-Laws) and its application must be accepted by the Presidents Committee upon a 
                                                     
57
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2011b) "Mitigating Systemic Risk A Role for Securities 
Regulators -  Discussion Paper ",Madrid. Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD347.pdf. At 
57. 
58
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2011a) "2010 IOSCO Annual Report",Madrid. Available 
at: http://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/2010/. At 6. 
59
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2011b) "Mitigating Systemic Risk A Role for Securities 
Regulators -  Discussion Paper ",Madrid. Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD347.pdf. At 
57. 
60
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2011a) "2010 IOSCO Annual Report",Madrid. Available 
at: http://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/2010/. At 6. 
61
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2010e) "Resolution on IOSCO’s Mission, Goals and 
Priorities," Madrid Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES26.pdf. At 2-3. 
62
 Moreover, the revision of IOSCO Principles in 2010 added eight new principles concerning systemic risks in markets. See: 
International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2010b) "Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation " Madrid Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD329.pdf.  
63
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2010e) "Resolution on IOSCO’s Mission, Goals and 
Priorities," Madrid Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES26.pdf. At 2. 
64
 Ibid. At 2. 
65
 Ibid. At 3. 
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recommendation of the IOSCO Board (Article 14).
66
 However, the application requirements change if 
the application concerns full, associate or affiliate membership. 
Full members enjoy the right to be part of IOSCO’s most important organs, like the Emerging Market 
Committee and the IOSCO Board (or the Technical Committee before the reform). Article 6 of the 
By-Laws states that: “A securities commission or a similar governmental body that is not a member is 
eligible for ordinary membership of the Organization”. The public nature requirement is further on 
strengthened by Article 7.1 and Article 7.2 which recognize that a self-regulatory body, such as a 
stock exchange, is eligible for ordinary membership only when its country of origin does not have a 
governmental regulatory body. It is then specified that if a governmental regulatory body is 
subsequently established, then the ordinary membership of the self-regulatory body lapses. Currently 
IOSCO has 115 ordinary members. 
In order to become a full member, an applicant must convey: (a) a brief description of the securities 
regulations existing in its country, including the bodies which exercise regulatory functions with 
regard to securities market;  (b) a translation of the primary securities legislation of its country in one 
of the official languages of the Organization; (c) a declaration, signed by the president of the applicant 
body, that the body has reviewed and accepts the present By-Laws and Resolutions adopted by the 
Presidents Committee. (Article 11).  
It is clear that IOSCO By-Laws do not delve into the nature and the depth of the regulatory powers 
enjoyed by a country’s securities commission. This is mainly because this legal aspect varies greatly 
from country to country, usually on the basis of the administrative law culture underlying their 
national traditions. However, IOSCO By-Laws seem to imply that a securities commission or a similar 
governmental body must have at least (some) secondary regulatory powers (with the primary 
regulatory powers remaining with the Legislature), and either broad or narrow enforcement 
mechanisms. A broad enforcement mechanism implies that the national securities commission has all 
the powers needed to directly enforce securities laws (like the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission
67
), while a narrow mechanism implies that the national securities commission can only 
impose administrative sanctions, report a possible breach to another (more powerful) authority, like a 
Ministry or a Court, and initiate a legal action (like the German Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht - BaFin
68
). 
The concern about the actual dimension of the enforcement powers of its ordinary members has been a 
constant characteristic of IOSCO. The old Preamble to IOSCO’s By-Laws stated that the 
Organization’s Members had to “provide mutual assistance to ensure the integrity of the markets by a 
vigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement against offences” 69, while the new 
one still emphasizes the importance of enforcement powers but puts them within a wider framework: 
“[the Members must] cooperate in developing, implementing and promoting adherence to 
internationally recognized and consistent standards of regulation, oversight and enforcement in order 
to protect investors, maintain fair, efficient and transparent markets, and seek to address systemic 
risks”70. Moreover, Principle 8 of the Objective and Principle of Securities Regulation, clearly states 
                                                     
66
 Before the reform occurred in 2011, Article 14 of IOSCO By-Laws provided for the Technical Committee to carry out the 
task of recommending the admittance of a new member. 
67
 According to the Securities Exchange Act, sec. 30A (d), the SEC can either carry out an enforcement proceeding before a 
so-called Administrative Law Judge (a figure that does not exist in Europe) or initiate a civil action before a federal court. 
68
 According to the German Securities Trading Act (WpHG), sec. 38, 39 I-III., BaFIN can impose fines in cases of 
administrative offences. 
69
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2003) "Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation 
" Madrid. Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf (2003) 
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 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2010c) "Resolution of the Presidents Committee on 
Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws to reflect change in structure," Madrid. Available at: 
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that “The regulator should have comprehensive enforcement powers” and Principle 9 provides that 
“The regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use of inspection, investigation, 
surveillance and enforcement powers and implementation of an effective compliance program.”71 
In particular, in November 1997, the Presidents’ Committee passed a Resolution on Enforcement 
Powers as regards information sharing. The point of the Presidents’ Committee was that, without the 
full authority of obtaining information, the entire enforcement mechanism (both domestic and cross-
border) could not operate. With this Resolution each ordinary member was asked to ensure that it or 
another authority in its jurisdiction had the necessary power to obtain information relevant to 
investigating and prosecuting potential violations so that such information could be shared with other 
members.
72
 
As regards the associate membership, this is usually reserved for associations of public regulatory 
bodies from countries that already have their national regulatory body as a full member (Article 8.1). 
The expression “association of public regulatory bodies” is, actually, quite vague and it covers bodies 
with some jurisdiction over a country’s market subdivision. Moreover, any other body with an 
appropriate responsibility for securities regulation, other than a self-regulatory body, can apply to 
become an associate member (Article 8.2). A clear example of this “double” nature of the associate 
membership is given by the US, which sees both the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the 
North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. as associate members, with the United 
States being primarily represented by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Currently, IOSCO has 
eleven Associate Members and, in order to become one, a potential candidate must simply include a 
description of the body itself and its mission (Article 12). 
As regards the affiliate membership, this is reserved to self-regulatory bodies or international bodies 
with an appropriate interest in securities regulation (Article 9.1). In order to become an affiliate 
member, an applicant must (a) include a description of its own structure and mission; and (b) be 
endorsed in writing by the ordinary member, or ordinary members
73
, of its country (but only when this 
condition is applicable) (Article 13). Currently IOSCO has 68 self-regulatory organizations registered 
as Affiliate Members. They gather in the SRO Consultative Committee – SROCC – and play an 
important consultative role within the Organization. As regards the international bodies with an 
appropriate interest in securities regulation, these are only seven, and among them are the International 
Monetary Fund, the International Capital Market Association, and the Asian Development Bank. 
i. The distribution of competences within the organization 
A key aspect of IOSCO governance is the fact that the Organization operates through a network of 
committees.
74
 And this was confirmed by the “Resolution of the Presidents’ Committee on 
Amendment to IOSCO’s By-laws to reflect change in structure”75 adopted by the Presidents’ 
                                                     
71
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2010b) "Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation " Madrid Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD329.pdf.(2010) 
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 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (1997) "A Resolution on Enforcement Powers," Montreal. 
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Committee in 2010. As of the 2012 Annual Meeting,
76
 the Organization will be comprised of the 
following organs:  
1. the Presidents Committee;  
2. the IOSCO Board;  
3. the Emerging Markets Committee;  
4. the General Secretariat;  
5. the Regional Committees;  
6. the Consultative Committees. 
The Presidents’ Committee is the IOSCO’s formal decision-making organ. It meets once a year at the 
Annual Conference and is made up of all the Presidents of the member agencies,
77
 both regular and 
associate, with each ordinary member having one vote at meetings
78
 and the associate members having 
the right to attend and speak at meetings.
79
 The Presidents’ Committee plays, by and large, a formal 
leading role for the organization and “has all the powers necessary or convenient to achieve the 
objectives of the Organization”.80 This implies that the Presidents’ Committee makes the most 
important decisions by: adopting the resolutions which can reformulate the IOSCO mission aims, 
setting up the Organization’s Operational Priorities, and, more importantly, amending the By-Laws; 
accepting the admission of new members; recognizing the Regional Committees; determining the 
annual contribution of members; and imposing sanctions upon members.
81
 In order to operate, a 
quorum of the Presidents’ Committee is achieved when the majority of the ordinary members attend 
the Annual Meeting.
82
  
The IOSCO Board will replace the Executive
83
 and the Technical
84
 Committees and the Advisory 
Board of the Emerging Markets Committee.
85
 This new Board will run the governance, standards 
                                                     
76
 The Presidents’ Committee conferred upon the Executive Committee the authority to do all it is deemed necessary for the 
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members were elected every two years at the Biennial Meeting. [International Organization of Securities Commissions - 
IOSCO (2011a) "2010 IOSCO Annual Report",Madrid. Available at: http://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/2010/..  ]It 
was composed of nineteen members: the Chairman of the Technical Committee, the Chairman of the Emerging Markets 
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[ibid.] Importantly, if, on the one hand, the Presidents’ Committee was the formal decision-making organ 
which officially made the most important decisions; on the other hand, the Executive Committee actually took some 
important decisions and formally undertook all the actions necessary to achieve IOSCO’s objectives.
 
[ibid.. At 47] And 
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setting, and development functions of the Organization
86
, mainly through the submission of 
Resolutions
87
 and the drafting of the Presidents’ Committee’s agenda88 (to be both approved by the 
Presidents’ Committee). Furthermore, it will prepare the program of activities and the IOSCO annual 
budget (to be afterwards approved the Presidents’ Committee)89, appoint the Secretary General90, 
recommend regional groupings of members for recognition by the Presidents Committee as Regional 
Committees
91
, recognize Consultative Committees
92
 (others beyond the SROCC), and recommend the 
Presidents’ Committee when sanctions should be imposed upon members.93 Moreover, the Board will 
also appoint the Secretary General for a period of up to three years
94
 and designate the members of a 
Consultative Committee.
95
 Finally, the Board will monitor the organization’s activities concerning its 
policy and standards setting, its regulatory capacity building, its market development strategy, its 
membership admission procedure, and its outreach and research programs.
96
  
Thus, the IOSCO Board, by replacing the Technical Committee and the Executive Committee, will 
become the key (and, actually, the only) executive organ of IOSCO: it will be the policy-making body 
handling the core activity of the Organization. In the words of the recently amended By-Laws: 
“IOSCO Board takes all decisions and undertakes all actions necessary or convenient to achieve the 
objectives of the Organization”97. The legal tool employed by the Board to carry out its activity will be 
the “Protocol”: this will be used in order to detail the administrative matters necessary or convenient 
for performing or giving effect to the By-Laws.
98
 It is still unclear how these protocols will actually 
work, but they look very much like “administrative decrees” typical of an executive body. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
84
 The Technical Committee was established in 1987 by the Executive Committee in order “to study critical issues affecting 
countries with developed securities markets”
 
[Lichtenstein, Cynthia C. (1991) "Bank for International Settlements: 
Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices' Consultative Paper on International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards," 30 International Legal Materials. (4).], for this reason it could be said to 
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[Sommer, A.A. Jr. (1996) "IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement Symposium: Internationalization of 
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As regards its term and composition, the Board is to be constituted for two years and established 
during the IOSCO Biennial Meeting.
99
 The Board members choose a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman 
from among themselves and these posts last for the term of the Board, namely after two years. These 
IOSCO Board members are: (a) the members of the existing Technical Committee
100
; (b) the 
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Emerging Markets Committee; (c) the Chairman of each 
Regional Committee; and (d) two ordinary members elected by each Regional Committee from among 
the ordinary members of that region. 
The Emerging Markets Committee is the other specialized committee, and it promotes the 
development and improves the efficiency of emerging securities and futures markets by means of: 
establishing principles and minimum standards, preparing training programs and “facilitating the 
exchange of information and transfer of technology and expertise.”101 Its work is carried out by five 
Working Groups (analogous to the IOSCO Board’s Standing Committees) covering the following 
topics: Disclosure and Accounting; Regulation of Secondary Markets; Regulation of Market 
Intermediaries; Enforcement and Exchange of Information; and Investment Management.  
Importantly, the Emerging Markets Committee has established several Task Forces tasked with 
studying, analyzing and assessing different (and very hot) issues. These are made up of: the “EMC 
Chairman’s Task Force”, established in October 2008 in order to evaluate the aftermaths of the global 
financial crisis on emerging markets, identify relevant regulatory issues and give formal suggestions as 
regards future developments
102; the “EMC Task Force on OTC Markets and Derivatives Trading”, 
which produced the report on OTC Markets and Derivatives Trading in Emerging Markets to help 
regulators examine  OTC markets in their home jurisdictions; the “EMC Task Force on 
Securitization”, whose report on Securitization and Securitized Debt Instruments in Emerging Markets 
gave important insights into how to handle securitization markets in emerging market jurisdictions; 
and, finally, the “EMC Task Force on the Development of Corporate Bond Markets in Emerging 
Markets”, established in January 2011 and tasked with producing a report to be used as assessment 
tool for evaluating the state of development of corporate bond markets in emerging markets.
103
 
In addition to the IOSCO Board and the Emerging Markets Committee, IOSCO has four Regional 
Committees, which meet mostly to discuss problems specific to their respective regions and 
jurisdictions: Africa/Middle-East Regional Committee; Asia-Pacific Regional Committee; European 
Regional Committee; and Inter-American Regional Committee. A regional committee acts as a forum 
in which its members discuss topics of special interest,
104
 as well as coordinating the distribution of 
information among its members,
105
 and providing recommendations and reports on specific regional 
issues. 
                                                     
99
 Ibid. Art. 37.1, Part 5. 
100
 The current members of the Technical Committee are the securities regulators of: Australia, Brazil, China, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Ontario, Québec, Spain, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and the United States. See: International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2011a) "2010 
IOSCO Annual Report",Madrid. Available at: http://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/2010/. At 47. 
101 http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=workingcmts . The Emerging Markets Committee has set up Working 
Groups in these areas: Disclosure and Accounting;  Regulation of Secondary Markets; Regulation of Market 
Intermediaries; Enforcement and the Exchange of Information; Investment Management . 
102
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2011a) "2010 IOSCO Annual Report",Madrid. Available 
at: http://www.iosco.org/annual_reports/2010/. At 14. 
103
 Ibid. At 16. 
104
 International Organization of Securities Commissions - IOSCO (2010c) "Resolution of the Presidents Committee on 
Amendment to IOSCO’s By-Laws to reflect change in structure," Madrid. Available at: 
http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES33.pdf. Art. 60(a), Part 8. 
105
  ibid. Art. 60(b), Part 8. 
Antonio Marcacci 
 
14 
Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) play an important role within the IOSCO structure: they are 
members of the SRO Consultative Committee (SROCC).
106
 The SROCC was established in 1989 
and currently has 69
107
 members representing securities and derivatives markets, mainly from the most 
developed economies. The most important stock exchanges of the world are members of the SROCC, 
for instance: New York Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange, National 
Stock Exchange of India, Shanghai Stock Exchange, Cayman Islands Stock Exchange, Euronext and 
Deutsche Börse AG. Their participation at IOSCO is aimed at making “a constructive input in the 
work of IOSCO”.108 The SROCC is constantly in contact with the IOSCO Board in order “to provide 
substantive input on their regulatory initiatives.”109 Within the Committee, the SROCC members are 
committed to working together and to the sharing of mutually useful regulatory information to ensure 
compliance with and enforcement of their securities laws and regulations.
110
 
The aims of the SROCC are: to improve the effectiveness and value of self-regulation so as to promote 
the efficiency, transparency and integrity of markets; to contribute to regulatory policy development; 
to identify potential investor protection and market integrity issues; effectively address the wide range 
of issues in securities markets; and, importantly, share experiences as SROs with other members and 
interested parties through seminars and training programs.
111
 
The SROCC is involved in the law-making process to the extent that it can make its voice heard. Its 
role is emphasized by the Model for effective Regulation,
112
 which highlights how SROs provide 
valuable industry input both in terms of codes of good conduct and master agreements, and in terms of 
the standardization of common practices. Thus, on the one hand the SROCC is an (informal) 
consultative body for the IOSCO Board; on the other hand, SROs and their normative productions are 
conceived as tools devised to achieve a “tighter degree of compliance by the market participants 
operating within the self-regulatory framework.”113 
Generally speaking, the 2010 Annual Report explicitly recognizes that self-regulatory organizations 
“augment regulatory resources, including establishing and enforcing rules, codes of conduct, 
developing standard documentation and best practices and taking disciplinary action for non-
compliance”114. Moreover, the value of self-regulation has been directly acknowledged by the 
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation since 1998, as it states that “the regulatory regime 
should make appropriate use of Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) that exercise some direct 
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oversight responsibility for their respective areas of competence, to the extent appropriate to the size 
and complexity of the markets.”115  
The main reasons why IOSCO relies on self-regulation are to allow for the observance of ethical 
standards provided by SROs and to enable a quicker and more flexible response to the changing 
market conditions compared to that provided by government authorities. Furthermore, Self-Regulatory 
Organizations have the expertise and knowledge that public regulators often lack.
116
 However, the 
IOSCO document states that “actions of SROs will often be limited by applicable contracts and 
rules”117 and that “SROs should be subject to the oversight of the regulator and should observe 
standards of fairness and confidentiality when exercising powers and delegated responsibilities,”118 so 
as to reaffirm that authority still lies in the regulators’ hands. In this perspective, the Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation states that an SRO is required to meet some authorization 
conditions.
119
 It is further specified that, even when self-regulation is used, the regulator should retain 
the authority to inquire into matters affecting investors or the market.  Thus, it is made clear how, once 
an SRO is operating, the regulator should assure that the exercise of the SRO’s power is “in the public 
interest, and results in fair and consistent enforcement of applicable securities laws, regulations and 
appropriate SRO rules.”120 Conflicts of interest are, therefore, seen as one of the main issues, 
especially when an SRO carries out both the supervision of its members and the regulation of a market 
sector.
121
  
Finally, the General Secretariat in Madrid carries out all the necessary administrative and 
organizational tasks, keeps the records of the Organization
122
; ensures that the By-Laws and 
Resolutions are kept up to date
123
; monitors whether the members comply with the By-Laws and 
Resolutions
124
; examines membership applications so as to ensure that they comply with the By-
Laws
125
; represents the Organization in meetings with or presentations to other groups and bodies
126
; 
and prepares the Annual Report of the Organization
127
. Before the reform, the Secretary General was 
appointed for a period of up to three years by the Executive Committee while now the appointing body 
is the IOSCO Board.
 128
 
The IOSCO governance should look like the following picture, which makes clear the central role 
played by the newly-established IOSCO Board: 
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ii. The IOSCO decision making procedure   
The Preamble of the IOSCO Bylaws officially recognizes that the best way to achieve the 
Organization’s aims is through consensus.129 Generally speaking, deciding through consensus means 
that the final deliberation is based on the “fairly prevailing opinion” on a particular subject, namely the 
common core shared by the participants.
130
 This is actually the method through which the members’ 
unanimity can be more easily achieved. Within this process an important role is played by the 
chairperson because s/he facilitates the achievement of the consensus.  
As regards IOSCO, all this means that before issuing a document, a general consensus on its content 
must be achieved: only if this is achieved can a guideline be supported and adopted by the 
Organization, or more specifically by the Presidents’ Committee. For this reason, IOSCO may look 
pretty democratic due to the fact that each Member has one seat and one vote at the Presidents’ 
Committee, in which all the Organization’s “sovereign” powers are vested. However, the Presidents’ 
Committee only meets once a year and most of the core “normative” work has, in practice, always 
been carried out by the Technical Committee, an elite body with no pre-established procedural rules. 
Indeed, slightly more precise (though still slender) rules concerning the decision-making process are 
provided only for amendments to the By-Laws, where article 36.3 of the By-Laws specifies that “A 
Resolution to amend the By-Laws must have the support of 2/3 of the members in attendance” [of the 
Presidents’ Committee Annual Meeting], and for the procedures to be followed when conducting 
public consultations.  
In the last case, in 2005 the Executive Committee published the “IOSCO Consultation Policy and 
Procedure”131 with the aim of clarifying for all interested parties the procedures through which they 
can submit comments on work projects aimed at the adoption of international standards and principles 
for the capital sector. In this document, the Executive Committee provides for several formal steps to 
be followed and states that, from now on, IOSCO “will generally include the conduct of a public 
consultation as part of” these work projects, granting the IOSCO SRO Consultative Committee the 
delicate bridge-role with the international financial community. Importantly, this document introduces 
a kind of self-“comply or explain” principle, namely it states that IOSCO will take comments into 
account in framing Final Reports and will provide a summary explanation of the manner in which 
public comments have been addressed or the reasons why they have not been addressed in a 
memorandum accompanying Final Reports”.132 This attitude clearly hints that the Self-Regulatory 
Organizations are granted some voice in the decision-making process and this is evident by the 
quantity (and quality) of the SROs’ comments on Reports that are publicly available on the 
Organization’s official website.133 Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for consumer associations as 
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no comments seem to have been submitted.
134
 However, it is also true that there are no rules 
prohibiting a consumer association from submitting a comment on a publicly available report. 
Another very important aspect of the IOSCO rule-making procedure is the fact that the IOSCO Board 
relies heavily on “working committees” in order to accomplish its tasks. Indeed, it set up specialized 
standing committees and its work is substantially carried out through these bodies. These standing 
committees meet regularly and work according to the instructions they receive from the IOSCO 
Board. There are six permanent committees at the moment and they cover the following areas: 
Multinational Disclosure and Accounting; Regulation of Secondary Markets; Regulation of Market 
Intermediaries; Enforcement and the Exchange of Information; Investment Management; Credit 
Rating Agencies.
135
 These standing committees are made up of experts from IOSCO full members
136
 
and they are designed to be work under the consensus method, as does the entire Organization. 
An example of this quite informal decision-making procedure can be found in the “Indexation: 
Securities Indices and Index Derivatives” Report.137 In May 2002, the Technical Committee (now 
IOSCO Board) mandated its Standing Committee on the Regulation of Secondary Markets to write a 
report concerning the indexation of securities indices and index derivatives. For several months, the 
Standing Committee worked on the issue, prepared a first draft of the report, and then sent it to the 
Technical Committee, which, during the 17th and 18th February 2003 meeting, approved and issued 
the report.
138
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Alongside the already existing Standing Committee, the IOSCO Board/Technical Committee can 
establish special task forces to deal with particular subjects, like the 2003 Task Force on credit rating 
agencies (CRAs) made up of the Technical Committee’s principal representatives,139 or the 
Chairmen’s Task Force on the Subprime Crisis formed in 2007.140 These “special” Task Forces 
usually draft documents that serve to help in the preparation of the Technical Committee’s reports. 
The following picture gives quite an indicative idea of this decision-making process: 
 
To sum up, the Standing Committees examine issues, analyze data, and study different policy options. 
They then forward their findings, commentaries and drafted reports to the IOSCO Board/Technical 
Committee which, on the basis of this work, will enact its own documents or simply approve and issue 
the Standing Committees’ reports. If the issue at hand concerns the Organization’s main objectives 
and an official position needs to be taken, then the Technical Committee’s document is forwarded to 
the Presidents’ Committee which uses it to comply with its statutory duties. 
Importantly, unlike previously under the Technical Committee, the recent governance reform 
establishes clearer rules concerning the internal decision-making process of the new “core” body. 
Article 44.1 states that half of the IOSCO Board constitutes a quorum and Article 44.2 provides that if 
necessary, namely if unanimity is not achieved, decisions are put to a vote and must have the support 
of the majority of the members in attendance. In the event of a tie, the Chairperson has the casting 
vote. Moreover, the Chairperson is also responsible for reporting the work of the IOSCO Board to the 
Presidents Committee during each Annual Meeting (Article 46) and s/he also has the power to ask 
other persons to attend the IOSCO Board’s meetings (Article 47). The Standing Committee system 
will still operate with the IOSCO Board replacing the Technical Committee. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
report on the issue of anti-money laundering (IOSCO Executive Committee (2005a) "Anti-Money Laundering Guidance 
For Collective Investment Schemes - Final Report." Available at: 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD205.pdf. (Available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD205.pdf).  
139
 IOSCO Executive Committee (2008b) "The Role Of Credit Rating Agencies In Structured Finance Markets - Final 
Report",Madrid. Available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD263.pdf. At 2. 
140
 IOSCO Executive Committee (2008a) "Report on the Subprime Crisis - Final Report",Madrid. Available at: 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD273.pdf. 
Antonio Marcacci 
 
20 
2. The EU in the Landscape of International Financial Law  
a. The Legal Grounds for the EU to be an International Player of Financial Law  
i. The explicit powers for the EU external action concerning the law of financial services 
As regards the internal dimension of European law on financial services, the EEC Treaty and its 
successors do not provide the Community/Union with a patent, clear and exclusive competence
141
 
unlike, for instance, the Common Commercial Policy.
142
 This implies that the EU law on financial 
services must be grounded on more general legal bases, like that concerning the internal market. 
In this context the legal lender of last resort was Article 2 TEC
143
, largely replaced by Article 3 TEU, 
which reads that “The Union shall establish an internal market” and “an economic and monetary 
union”. More concretely, the EC/EU law on financial services is entrenched in the so-called free 
movement of capital, free provision of services and freedom of establishment, as provided for by 
Article 14 TEC
144
 now Article 26 TFEU, which states that “The internal market shall comprise an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.” Whenever it was not possible to establish a 
single European financial market through the four freedoms, harmonizing measures were adopted in 
order to build the single European market on common harmonized rules.
145
  
Specifically speaking, practically all the legislation concerning financial services enacted over the 
years has been widely based on Article 50 TFEU (former Article 44 TEC) on freedom of 
establishment and Article 53 TFEU (former Article 47 TEC) on the taking up and pursuing of 
activities by self-employed persons. An important role has also been played by Article 62 TFEU 
(former Article 55 TEC) on services; and Article 115 TFEU (former Article 94 TEC) and Article 114 
TFEU (former Article 95 TEC) on measures for the approximation of Member State’s rules.146 
Importantly, the directives dealing with the issuance and trade of securities are generally based on 
Article 50 TFEU, while the directives dealing with financial intermediaries and their activities are 
usually based on Article 53 TFEU. 
It is worth noting that Article 63 TFEU (ex Article 56 TEC)
147
 provides for an exclusive competence 
of the EU as regards the prohibition of all restrictions on capital movements not only between Member 
States but also between Member States and third countries. However, it has not been used as a legal 
basis for legislation on financial services and only recently it has been utilized.
148
The main reason for 
not using Art. 63 as the legal basis for the EU law on financial services should be that the freedom of 
capital movements simply represents the general framework within which it is possible to realize a 
common European financial market. However, this framework cannot be enough. Further rules 
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concerning financial instruments and financial institutions are needed and these do not concern the 
free movement of capital sic et simpliciter. Thus, most of the EU legislation dealing with financial law 
in entrenched in arts. 50 and 53. 
Due to the fact that financial services may fall into the macro category of services, it might be thought 
that they are covered by EU’s exclusive competence on trade, the so-called Common Commercial 
Policy – CCP. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EC had exclusive competence as 
regards trade in goods and shared competence as regards trade in some services and commercial 
aspects of intellectual property (former Article 133 (5) and (6) TEC). In Opinion 1/94 the ECJ deals 
with the relationship between the pre-Lisbon CCP and the provision of services in general. Within the 
legal framework of the time, the Court clarified that only those services provided on a cross-border 
basis by a supplier established in one Member State to a consumer resident in another Member State 
could fall within the remit of trade in services as envisaged by the CCP.
149
 The reasoning behind this 
decision was the fact that services provided across borders are sufficiently similar to the trade in goods 
covered by then Article 113
150
 (Article 133 TEC according to the post Amsterdam numeration). Here 
the ECJ simply followed the same logic adopted by Article 1(2)
 
of the GATS,
151
 which defines the 
“trade in services” as follows: 
For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply of a service: 
(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member; 
(b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member; 
(c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other 
Member; 
(d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the 
territory of any other Member.
152
 
So, in the pre-Lisbon regime, for a service to fall inside the CCP its provision had to be inherently 
cross frontier. And since financial services are widely provided by branches of financial firms legally 
established in another Member State, then financial services legislation could not but end up falling in 
the remit of freedoms of establishment (Article 50 TFEU and Article 53 TFEU) and not in that of the 
CCP. Under the pre-Lisbon regime, the CCP did not clearly cover financial services due to the way 
they are supplied. 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been endowed with an exclusive 
competence for trade in goods and services, commercial aspects of intellectual property and foreign 
direct investment. This reform aims at giving the EU full powers as regards international agreements 
dealing with trade in goods and trade in services and does so by shifting from shared to exclusive 
competence, and putting an end to many mixed agreements.
153
 Article 207(1) TFEU clearly states: 
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The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to 
changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and 
services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the 
achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and measures to protect 
trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial 
policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external 
action. 
It might be thought that this new, large, and solid legal basis could be also used to conclude 
international agreements concerning financial services. However, as regards services, the Lisbon 
Treaty modifies the depth of competences without modifying the subject matter of these competences: 
it does not seem to change the content of the competence in order to grant the EU an exclusive 
competence covering all issues concerning services. The TFEU, indeed, only refers to “trade in 
services” and this seems to confirm the intention to continue using the categorization adopted by the 
GATS/WTO and already followed by the ECJ in its Opinion 1/94. If this is so, then financial services 
are to remain outside the “new” CCP due to the way in which they are provided (freedom of 
establishment VS cross-frontier provision of services). 
Finally, we may consider the possibility of grounding financial services legislation in the brand-new 
exclusive competence regarding foreign direct investments. However, foreign direct investments 
cannot be assimilated to financial services: the former concern an investment made by a company 
established in country A directly in the territory of country B; whilst the latter concern the provision of 
services related to financial needs, from banking to investment. Moreover, the European Commission 
has also clarified that foreign direct investments do not even cover portfolio investments.
154
 Since 
portfolio investments concern funds passively invested in securities, the European Commission’s 
statement of exception eliminates altogether any remote and hypothetical connection between 
financial services and foreign direct investments. 
Thus, even under the Lisbon Treaty, the only explicit external competence regarding financial markets 
concerns the prohibition of free movements of capital between the Member States and third countries 
but this does not cover the legislation dealing with financial services. Similarly, notwithstanding the 
fact that art. 32 TEU clearly states that the EU has legal personality (“The Union shall have legal 
personality”), this does not enable the EU Commission to freely negotiate whatever kind of agreement 
it may want. All this means that if the EU wishes to enter into international binding agreements 
concerning the provision of financial services, it must do so by supporting its external activity through 
implied external powers arising from Article 50, Article 53, Article 62, Article 115, and Article 114. 
ii. The doctrine of the implied external powers … 
Generally speaking, the doctrine of the implied powers has always stated that the EEC/EC/EU could 
act externally, by concluding agreements with third countries, even in circumstances where the 
Treaties do not envisage an explicit power for doing so. However, such an “external power” does not 
apply every single time the EEC/EC/EU wishes to enter into an international agreement, but only 
when several requirements are met. The ECJ has been the author of this doctrine by both setting up the 
conditions for its existence and delimiting its concrete application.
155
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The first case dealing with the so-called implied powers was the 1971 AETR case, which stands for 
the European agreement on transport.
156
 On that occasion, the ECJ mentioned for the first time the 
possibility for the then EEC to act externally on the basis of implied powers deriving from explicit 
competences granted by the Treaties. The ECJ stated that once a piece of European legislation is 
adopted with the aim of developing a common policy as prescribed by the Treaties, then, on the one 
hand, the EEC has the power to act externally in order to preserve the integrity of the harmonizing 
rules, and, on the other hand, the “Member States no longer have the right, acting individually or even 
collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which affect those rules”.157 
If the 1971 AETR case establishes that the then EEC can enjoy implied external powers once an 
internal policy has already been developed, the 1976 Kramer case pushes the boundary a bit further 
by stating that the Community has implied external powers even when common rules are yet to be 
adopted.
158
 However, with the aim of avoiding a legislative vacuum, the ECJ carefully clarifies that the 
Member States still enjoy a transitional concurrent competence which would give way only when the 
Community’s competence is exercised.159 A year later, with the Opinion 1/76, the ECJ even stated 
that “internal competence may be effectively exercised only at the same time as external competence” 
where the conclusion of an international agreement was “necessary in order to attain objectives of the 
Treaty that cannot be attained by establishing autonomous rules.”160 However, this Opinion is still a 
special case and the Court subsequently specified that internal harmonizing legislation is usually a pre-
requisite for the Community to exercise exclusive implied powers.
161
   
Two other Opinions help give a clearer overview: Opinion 1/94
162
 on the competence of the 
Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual 
property (the specific case we have already seen and concerning the GATS/WTO Agreement), and 
Opinion 1/2003
163
 on the competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.  
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These two Opinions use two different grounds to justify the competence of the Community to enter 
into international agreements. Firstly, Opinion 1/94 follows the so-called effet utile approach,
164
 which 
means that the EC/EU has the authority to undertake international obligations when this is needed in 
order to achieve a specific Treaty objective even in the absence of an expressed provision. Conversely, 
Opinion 1/2003 follows the so-called pre-emption approach,
165
 which means that the competence of 
the EC/EU to enter into international agreements can arise directly from legislative measures (such as 
Directives or Regulations) adopted by the European institutions, as happened in the AERT case where 
internal policy had already been developed and the EEC was recognized as having the power to act 
externally in order to preserve the integrity of the harmonizing internal rules.
166
 
However, both approaches highlight one important feature of the implied powers: these are 
unavoidably connected either to an internal objective or an internal policy, but such strong connections 
also represent the limits to the EU’s implied external powers. This is because the EU can act externally 
only on internal bases, so that an external policy independent of the necessities and functioning of an 
internal regime is just not possible. An independent external policy is possible only when explicit 
powers are conferred.
167
 
Importantly, we also need to focus on the level of harmonization pursued by the EU law and the way 
it affects the depth of its external action, namely whether the EC has shared or exclusive 
competence. In Opinion 1/94, the ECJ clearly stated that the EC could acquire exclusive external 
competence “where the Community has achieved complete harmonization of the rules governing 
access to a self-employed activity, because the common rules thus adopted could be affected within 
the meaning of the AETR judgment if the Member States retained freedom to negotiate with non-
member countries.”168 Importantly, the Court also said that this “is not the case in all service sectors” 
and it decided that the “competence to conclude GATS is shared between the Community and the 
Member States”.  
So, when a high degree of harmonization in all sectors covered by an agreement is not achieved, then 
the EC and Member States can only conclude mixed agreements, as was seen in the WTO/GATS case. 
Mixed agreements are accords concerning areas of shared competence between the EC and Member 
States. This shared competence implies that an agreement must be ratified both at the European and 
national levels, thus granting any Member State unhappy about the content of an agreement the power 
to entirely veto it.
 169
 Moreover, when the EU adopts minimum harmonizing legislation according to a 
competence which is internally shared, then a shared external competence is possible
170
 and this is 
likely to leave considerable room for Member States to maneuver. However, the ECJ never fully 
clarified the distinction between the existence of implied external powers and the nature of their 
competence.
171
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The Lisbon Treaty seems to resolve and clarify the issue of the exclusive/shared competence as 
regards the EU’s external action. Indeed, the Article 3 TFEU states that: “The Union shall also have 
exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided 
for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal 
competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.” The effect of 
this provision seems to overcome the implied shared competence and, hence, eliminate the issue of 
mixed agreements altogether.
172
 This seems to be confirmed by reading Article 3 in combination with 
Article 216 TFEU,
173
 which summarizes the implied powers principle and constitutionalizes this 
doctrine. Indeed, Article 216 states that “the Union may conclude an agreement with one or more 
third countries or international organizations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of 
an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the 
objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to 
affect common rules or alter their scope.” Article 216, thus, clearly reaffirms that that the scope of the 
Union’s powers to conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international 
organizations is based on either the pre-emption approach or the effet utile approach. Finally, it should 
be noted that the picture is completed by Article 218 TFEU (ex Article 300 TEC) which establishes 
the procedure to be followed when the EU negotiates and concludes this kind of agreements.  
iii. … and its application to the EU law of financial services 
After having exposed laid out an evolutionary account of the doctrine of implied powers, it would be 
logical to test whether this can be applied to the EU law on financial services. As mentioned above, 
the legal basis upon which the EC/EU has enacted directives and regulations is connected to the 
completion of the single market and the freedoms of establishment and to provide services. In this 
context, no explicit external competence is granted to the EC/EU, and if it wants to enter a binding 
international agreement it must do so through implied powers and by complying with the procedure 
set down in Article 218 TFEU. The deeper level of internal harmonization, the stronger the need for 
implied powers.  
As regards the applicability of the doctrine of implied powers to financial services, it might be useful 
to see the evolution of the EU law of financial services over the years and notice a shift from 
minimum (such as the Investment Services Directive – Directive 93/22/EEC) to maximum 
harmonization (like the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive – Directive 2004/39/EC), 
symbolizing the growing attention being paid to it by the EC.
174
 The increasing use of maximum 
harmonization in the pre-Lisbon regime also implied that, in potential cases of binding international 
agreements concerning financial services, the EU’s competence was likely to be exclusive. However, 
we have just come to see how, under the current post-Lisbon regime, the EU seems to enjoy exclusive 
external competence all the time. 
So, up to now, we have verified that under the Lisbon Treaty, on the one hand, the EU financial 
services law still falls outside the CCP, hence, it does not enjoy any explicit external competence. On 
the other hand, the EU does enjoy implied exclusive external competence stemming from Article 3 and 
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Article 216 TFEU, no matter the degree of harmonization. From this standpoint, we can test whether a 
situation similar to that which occurred for the Open Skies cases may also take place for international 
financial law agreements. The Open Skies cases are a clear example of the implied powers-related 
“fight” between Member States and the EU institutions when it comes to negotiating agreements with 
third countries, in particular with the US. As the US is the biggest financial market in the world, is not 
a great leap to imagine that something similar might take place in international financial law as well.  
The Open Skies cases
175
 concerned air transport agreements between several European countries and 
the United States. Before the Commission made the decision to take these EU Member States to the 
Court, it had requested – unsuccessfully – three times to have the right to negotiate international air 
transport agreements while several Member States had been negotiating their own bilateral agreements 
with the US.
176
 The Commission grounded its action on three points: the bilateral agreements breached 
the principles of freedom of persons and corporations as set up by Article 49 TFEU (former art. 43 
TEC); the Member States had lost their negotiating power due to the fact that the then EC had already 
legislated on the field at issue; finally, those bilateral agreements were likely to violate not only the EC 
competition law, but also undermine the freedom to provide services throughout the Union.
177
  
In November 2002, the Court decided that: many of the bilateral agreements under examination 
breached several aspects of both EC primary treaty law and secondary legislation; the bilateral 
agreements breached the principle of freedom of establishment of corporations because these 
agreements gave other Member States’ airlines a treatment different from that reserved for the 
signatory Member State’s airlines (the so-called “nationality clauses”); once EU legislation has been 
enacted to implement an internal policy, then the EU’s jurisdiction is projected externally.178  
The Open Skies cases are particularly important because they implicitly, but clearly, stated that it is 
not possible for a Member State to seek to obtain advantages exclusive to it when negotiating bilateral 
agreements with foreign states.
179
 If we apply the same patterns to financial law, we may imagine a 
bilateral agreement between a Member State and the US concerning, for instance, the opportunity for a 
signatory Member State’s financial firm to operate in the US enjoying a competitive advantage with 
respect to other Member States’ financial firms. The same would be true for a US financial firm 
operating in the signatory Member State and enjoying a competitive advantage with respect to other 
Member States’ financial firms. 
Nevertheless, what must be noticed when examining international financial law is the legal nature of 
the international “agreements” signed by the contracting parties. Indeed, unlike fields such as aviation, 
trade or monetary affairs, international financial law is established through networks made up of 
domestic public bodies (like IOSCO) which enter into non-binding soft-law commitments.
180
 
Therefore, the question here is not so much whether the EU can use implied powers to enter into 
binding international agreements in a field, like financial law, almost entirely covered by European 
legislation; but rather, we must query whether the European Commission can freely “negotiate” non-
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binding soft-law commitments without complying with the procedure set up by Article 218 TFEU. 
The reason for this is that there are no binding agreements in this field, only soft-law commitments. 
In this respect, the European Court of Justice has drawn a clear line between hard- and soft-law 
regulatory agreements. As regards the first type of agreements, characterized by having binding
181
 
effects on the contracting parties and by being capable of generating liability at the international level 
in case of non-performance,
182
 in Case C-327/91
183
 the ECJ clearly stated that the authority of the 
Commission was tempered by the formal procedures set down by the Treaty (such as Article 218 
TFEU, ex Article 300 TEC and original Article 228 EEC Treaty), which provide for a primary role of 
the Council in the field of international agreements, with the Commission’s negotiating powers limited 
to the extent of the authorization granted to it by the Council. The ECJ additionally specified that the 
institutional balance between the Council and the Commission was not susceptible to being modified 
even in cases of exclusive competences of the EC. Conversely, in Case C-233/02,
184
 the ECJ clearly 
held that the European Commission is endowed with the power to negotiate and conclude soft-law 
regulatory agreements with no binding effects on the contracting parties.  
Given that this case law of the ECJ clearly establishes different regimes for binding and non-binding 
international agreements, the leeway left to the European Commission to enter into international 
financial law commitments and “negotiate” the contents of non-binding agreements is much broader 
than the discretion it would have under the implied powers doctrine. Furthermore, even if a struggle 
between the Commission and some Member States, such as that which occurred in the Open Skies 
cases, was to appear as regards international financial regulatory agreements, the European 
Commission would be likely to win – not because of the implied powers doctrine but because of the 
primacy of EU law also concretized through harmonization rules. Indeed, once the content of these 
soft-law regulatory agreements is incorporated into harmonized European rules, the Member States 
cannot avoid being bound to it and any soft-law commitments to third countries end up being an 
empty shell. 
b. The Legally Ambiguous Involvement of the EU in IOSCO and its Growing (Political) External 
Influence  
i. The legally ambiguous involvement of the EU in IOSCO … 
As regards the formal status of the European Union in IOSCO, the European Commission is merely an 
Affiliate Member. It is represented through its Directorate General for Internal Market and Services, 
and more specifically by Unit G3 of its Directorate G which focuses on Financial Services Policy and 
Financial Markets. It goes without saying that this seems to be too little in light of the impact that EU 
Law has had on its Members’ national financial laws in the last decades. As of February 2012, the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is also registered as an affiliate member.
185
 
However, from a more legalistic viewpoint, we cannot hide the actual legal weaknesses of the EU. 
This weakness can be found both in the internal aspect, i.e. the legal basis of the European law for 
financial services, and from the external point of view, i.e. the capacity of the EU to conclude 
international agreements concerning international financial law. 
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However, after studying the IOSCO’s By-Laws, one comes to realize that the big hurdle for the 
Commission (or ESMA) to fully join IOSCO is not so much about the EU’s legal bases concerning 
financial law, as it is to do with the requirements necessary to become an IOSCO full member. Indeed, 
IOSCO By-Laws clearly provide that, in order to become ordinary member, a potential applicant must 
be either a securities commission or a similar governmental body, and there is no EU body that can 
fulfill this requirement.  
The new ESMA, recently established by Regulation 1095/2010
186
, does not have the required 
regulatory powers. This stems from the fact that, traditionally speaking, European agencies
187
 cannot 
enjoy full decision-making and rule-making powers. Unfortunately, this core deficiency remains even 
though ESMA has a recognized legal personality, and is a permanent and relatively independent 
body.
188
 Thus, as ESMA looks like a mélange between an agency and a coordinator of agencies 
prevents it from achieving full IOSCO membership status. In September 2011, the ESMA 
Management Board discussed the possibility of becoming an observer on the IOSCO Board and an 
IOSCO associate member “if proposed changes to IOSCO’s by-laws are adopted at its next annual 
meeting”189. Therefore, the decision to allow ESMA become an affiliate member in February 2012 
looks like a politically fair compromise. 
Importantly, despite all these hurdles, the European Commission has played a much more active – 
although still informal – role in the international financial arena since the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
broke out. This watershed coincides with the elaboration and signature of the Lisbon Treaty at the end 
of 2007 and its entry into force on 1
st
 December 2009. It is worth noting that, even if the Lisbon Treaty 
does not confer upon the EU any extra competence as regards the law on financial and banking 
services, it does introduce some changes in the remit of the EU external action
190
 which are likely to 
give the EU a more prominent international role. Furthermore, given the essential soft nature of 
international financial law
191
, a deeper involvement of the EU in the global arena may have important 
implications for the EU financial law.  
Before 2007, cooperation between IOSCO and EU bodies was already taking place but it was 
extremely informal. In 2004, for instance, within the framework of its activity on credit risk transfer, 
the Joint Forum of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCSB),
192
 IOSCO and the International 
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Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)
193
 officially declared that they had “undertaken efforts to 
coordinate with similar projects initiated in the European Union”194, in particular, European Bank’s 
Bank Supervision Committee (BSC), Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pension 
Supervisors (CEIOPS) and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), the predecessor 
of the European Securities Markets Authority.
195
 More specifically, as regards the relationship 
between IOSCO and the Committee of European Securities Regulators, the latter was explicitly 
mentioned in the “Final Communiqué of the XXXI Annual Conference of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)”196, which took place in Hong Kong from 5-8 June 
2006. The Final Communiqué reads that IOSCO was planning to establish an International Financial 
Reporting Standards Database and that, for this reason, it was liaising with the CESR because it had 
already developed and implemented a similar database for use in the European Union. 
However, things become much more interesting as the financial crisis starts looming. On November 
6
th
 2007, the Trustees of the International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation (IASCF), the 
oversight body of the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), announced a strategy to 
enhance the organization’s governance and its public accountability as including, among other things, 
the establishment of a formal reporting link to official organizations.
197
 On the next day, November 7
th
 
2007, the European Commission, the Financial Services Agency of Japan, the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
adopted a joint statement in which they proposed the establishment of a new monitoring body within 
the IASC Foundation, tasked with reviewing and commenting on the IASB’s work program; 
participating in and having the final approval in the selection of the IASCF Trustees; and reviewing 
the Trustees’ oversight activities.198 In this joint statement, all the signatories are defined as the 
“authorities responsible for capital market regulation” – thereby putting the European Commission on 
the same level of the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
199
 In May 2008, the IASC Trustees 
announced the establishment of a round-table discussion to be held in the following weeks.
200
 The day 
before this round-table was held, on June 18
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 2008, the “world’s securities authorities – represented 
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by IOSCO, as well as the European Commission, the Japan Financial Services Agency and the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the securities authorities in the world’s three largest capital 
markets”201 issued a joint press-release to welcome the upcoming Roundtable organized by the IASCF 
regarding the creation of an IASCF Monitoring Group. At the meeting of the IASC Trustees on 15 and 
16 January 2009, the decision to establish a formal link to the Monitoring Board of public authorities 
was definitively taken
202
. At the moment, the members of the Monitoring Board consist of the 
Emerging Markets Committee and the Technical Committee of IOSCO, the European Commission, 
the Financial Services Agency of Japan (JFSA), and US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
The main responsibilities of the Monitoring Board are to ensure that the IASC Trustees carry out their 
duties as defined by the IFRS Foundation Constitution, and to approve the appointment or 
reappointment of the Trustees.
203
  
A second important example of this “post-crisis upgrade” is given by the 2008 invitation sent to the 
European Commission to join (another) Monitoring Group. This is a forum, established in 2005, 
whose main mission is to “cooperate in the interest of promoting high-quality international auditing 
and assurance, ethical and education standards for accountants”.204 Its original members were IOSCO, 
the Financial Stability Forum, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and The World Bank.
205
  
This Monitoring Group invitation was followed by an invitation to join, under the status of observer, 
the working group on the review of the “Recommendations for Central Counterparties” jointly set up 
by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS)
206
 and the IOSCO Technical 
Committee. This working group aims at reviewing the application of the “2004 CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendations for Central Counterparties”207 on standards for risk management of a central 
counterparty and clearing arrangements for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. The working group’s 
participants consist of representatives from: the central banks already members of the CPSS; the 
securities commissions already members of the IOSCO Technical Committee; and, finally, the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
208
 The first chairpersons of this working group were 
Daniela Russo, from the European Central Bank, and Jeffrey Mooney, from the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission.
209
 Interestingly, by reading some specialized on-line newspaper articles, it 
seems that this “invitation” was a somewhat troublesome: as of February 2010, the EU institutions 
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were excluded from this working group, to the disappointment of EU officials
210
 but, by the end of 
March 2010, the European Commission (EC) was granted the status of observer.
211
 
However, the great leap forward was the OTC Derivatives Working Group. This was established in 
April 2010 after the G-20 leaders’ declaration of September 2009 requesting that, by the end of 2012, 
all standardized over-the-counter contracts be traded on exchanges (or, if appropriate, electronic 
trading platforms) and cleared through central counterparties so as to improve transparency, mitigate 
systemic risk, and protect against market abuse.
212
 The Group was officially chaired by the CPSS, 
IOSCO and the European Commission and was tasked with setting out “policy options supporting the 
consistent implementation of appropriate measures regarding trading, clearing, and reporting across 
jurisdictions.”213 The regulatory options prepared by the OTC Working Group were incorporated into 
a report, and later submitted to the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in October 
2010 by way of a Financial Stability Board Report.
214
 
The OTC Derivatives Working Group was quickly followed by the Task Force on OTC Derivatives 
Regulation. This was established in October 2010 with the aims of: developing international standards 
concerning OTC derivatives regulation in the areas of clearing, trading, trade data collection and 
reporting, and the oversight of certain market players; coordinating other international initiatives 
concerning the regulation of OTC derivatives; and serving as an internal IOSCO forum that IOSCO 
members can consult when dealing with issues concerning OTC derivatives regulation.
215
 Importantly, 
the Task Force is led by
216
 the US SEC, the US CFTC, the UK FSA and the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India. Meanwhile, the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA), the European 
Commission, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), and the OTC Derivatives 
Supervisors Group have a formal right to appoint observers to the Task Force.  
Thus, what seems to be clear as regards the role of the EU in IOSCO, and in the international financial 
regulatory arena in general, is the increasing role of the EU Commission (or its agencies). Importantly, 
this increasing role does not have the same legal features which characterize both international 
financial law and IOSCO standards: it is soft, legally informal. Indeed, IOSCO’s standards are non-
binding insofar as any EU external action in the financial services domain is not supported by hard 
legal grounds. All this leads to the assumption that the EU is very likely to play an increasingly 
prominent role in the global financial landscape, and it will be helped in doing so by the soft-law 
dimension in which it operates and by the new general external powers granted by the Lisbon Treaty. 
ii.  … And the EU’s growing (political) external influence 
The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on December 1
st
 2009, provides the EU with a coherent 
external action framework for the first time. It gathers together all the aspects of the EU’s external 
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formal leeway under the umbrella of the “Union’s external action”. To be exact, the Lisbon Treaty 
brings together: the Common Foreign and Security Policy;
217
 Common Commercial Policy; economic, 
financial and technical co-operation with foreign countries; humanitarian aid; and the external aspect 
of any other policy as indicated by Article 21(3) TEU which clearly states that “the Union shall ensure 
consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other 
policies”.218 All this is now enshrined in Title V of the Treaty of the European Union and in Part V of 
the Treaty of the functioning of the European Union.  
The simplification brought by the Lisbon Treaty is clear: we now have one relevant grouping in each 
Treaty, whereas before there was Title V TEU dealing with the common foreign and security policy, 
while the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) provided Title IX on Common 
commercial policy; Title XX on Development cooperation; Title XXI on Economic, financial and 
technical cooperation with third countries, international agreements, restrictive measures, international 
relations and instruments among the general and final provisions (Part Six).
219
 Alongside this 
simplification, the Lisbon Treaty also enhances the external competence of the EU as we have already 
seen under the Common Commercial Policy. 
Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty links all EU external action to the Union’s founding values, as is clearly 
stated by Article 3 TEU and by Article 21 (1) TEU: “The Union’s action on the international scene 
shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, 
and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of 
equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law”.  
This link between the EU’s external action and the EU’s values is also confirmed by Article 207 (1) 
TFEU on the EU’s trade policy, when it states that “The common commercial policy shall be 
conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action.” This 
provision implies that the recently strengthened CCP can now be used not only for economic goals, 
but also for human rights purposes, thus possibly even paving the way for conditionality in trade 
policy
220
 and for putting human rights/democracy clauses in international agreements.
221
 The use of 
conditionality in the common commercial policy may be also reinforced by the expanding role of the 
European Parliament. This latter had more powers as regards CCP agreements vested in it by the 
Lisbon Treaty and, in 2006, declared it would give its consent only to commercial agreements 
containing human rights clauses.
222
 
Even if an analysis of the new EU external action clearly goes far beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
important to highlight its main features in order to understand the overall external dimension in which 
the EU now plays. This is because it is quite reasonable to assume that, if the EU gains more (legally 
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grounded) powers to conclude both bilateral and multilateral binding agreements with foreign 
countries which even go beyond its mere economic goals by including new hot political aims, then its 
influence on the international scene is very likely to grow, especially in informal standard-setting 
forums. What we have just come to see in the case of IOSCO and the role played by the EU in the last 
three or four years seems to prove this assumption. 
3. The Implementation of IOSCO Standards through EU Law: The Case of Investor 
Protection 
a. The EU Law on Investor Protection  
i. The most important pieces of European legislation  
The Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Directives  
UCITS is not a simple single directive, but a set of directives enacted in Europe since 1985. The first 
text was Directive 85/611/EEC
223
, the so-called UCITS I. An attempt to reform UCITS I was made in 
the early ‘90s, but it failed (the so-called UCITS II proposal). In 2001, Directive 2001/107/EC224 and 
Directive 2001/108/EC
225
 were enacted (the so-called UCITS III).  Finally, in 2009, Directive 
2009/65/EC
226
, the so-called UCITS IV, was adopted and it was followed by two implementing 
Commission Recommendations (583/2010 and 584/2010)
227
 and two Commission directives 
(2010/42/EU and 
 
2010/43/EU)
228
.  
This set of directives regulates collective investment schemes and it principally aims at creating a 
single European market by allowing funds to be managed on a cross-border basis through a system of 
mutual recognition and authorization. For the purpose of this paper, the last directive, UCITS IV, 
followed by Regulation 583/2010, are particularly important. This is because it has introduced the Key 
Information Investor document, which replaced the simplified prospectus.  
The simplified prospectus was introduced by Directive 2001/107/EC in order to enhance the provision 
of effective investor information. Afterwards, the Commission Recommendation 2004/384/EC
229
 was 
adopted in order to clarify the contents and present “some of the elements of information which have 
to be included into the simplified prospectus”.230 The recommendation specified that the simplified 
prospectus was “designed to provide clear information about the essentials the investor should know 
before investing in a fund, and be easily understood by the average retail investor.”231 The simplified 
prospectus was “also designed to facilitate the cross-border marketing of units of UCITS, and be used 
as a single marketing tool throughout the Community.”232 Therefore, the two key elements of this 
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Recommendation were: the notion of an average retail investor and a single market for units of 
UCITS.  
However, the simplified prospectus proved to be inefficient, due to the following problems: 
inconsistent implementation across Member States; insufficient harmonization (mainly in respect of 
costs, fees, and statistical data); it was unnecessarily costly for the industry and of a very limited use to 
investors;
233
 use of a weak legal instrument, a Recommendation, to clarify the simplified prospectus 
content; investor-unfriendly content (too long and complex, not meaningful and incomprehensible for 
the average retail investor as defined by the Recommendation); and the format/design did not allow 
different funds to be compared.
234
 
To overcome the above mentioned problems, the simplified prospectus was replaced by a stand-alone, 
pre-contractual document: the Key Information Investor document (KII). This document was designed 
to help create a single market for investment funds and to provide retail investors with better 
disclosure, more comprehensible content, and standardized formats which facilitate the comparison 
between products. Moreover, the KII must contain the investment objectives and policy of the UCITS, 
its risk-reward profile, all the costs and associated charges, the UCITS past performance, and, finally, 
a range of practical information.
235
 All this aims at reinforcing investors’ confidence through providing 
them with more comprehensible information. 
The Key Information Investor document needs to be written in plain language and have a clear layout. 
To begin with, it must avoid: jargon, complex concepts and specialist language; words with different 
meanings in normal usage which could be misleading; and legalistic or foreign words. Further, it not 
only sets out the essential pre-defined information, but also requires that complex information must be 
presented clearly using short sentences of no more than 25 words with a clear layout.
236
 As regards the 
layout, the KII needs to be clear, appealing and attract the investor’s attention, without appearing to be 
a formal legal document: “the right design choices make a document easier to read and its information 
easier to understand.”237 
The Key Information Investor is intended to be an optimized and investor-friendly version of the 
simplified prospectus. Indeed, Recital 59 affirms that: “A single document of limited length presenting 
the information in a specified sequence is the most appropriate manner in which to achieve the clarity 
and simplicity of presentation that is required by retail investors, and should allow for useful 
comparisons, notably of costs and risk profile, relevant to the investment decision.” Thus, Article 
78(5) states that the KII needs to “be presented in a way that is likely to be understood by retail 
investors”. 
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The prospectus directive  
Directive 2003/71/EC, the so-called Prospectus Directive,
238
 is, like the Market in Financial 
Instrument Directive – MiFID (see below), a full harmonization directive. This Directive applies to all 
firms which want to issue their securities within the securities market of a Member State, no matter 
where the firm comes from. A directly applicable Regulation (809/2004/EC) completes Directive 
2003/71/EC. The regulation defines the information that shall be included in a prospectus and that 
which must be incorporated by reference; it also provides a standard format and information on how a 
prospectus should be published. The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) played a 
significant role in defining the information included in a prospectus, and, indeed, the regulation was 
largely based on its technical advice.
239
  
The core aim of the Directive is the creation of a single passport for issuers (like the MiFID does for 
investment services providers – see below) in order to establish a single European market for securities 
and financial services. Investor protection through market transparency is an ancillary, though 
essential, goal for the creation of a single market, and it is explicitly mentioned in Preambles 12, 16, 
18, 19, 20, 21, 29 and in articles 21.3, 21.4 and 23.2.2, of the directive. The implementing regulation is 
more technical and has only general references (such as article 28.5, or more implicitly, preamble 
30).
240
  
Directive 2010/73/EC,
241
 in amending the Prospectus Directive, introduced a categorization of clients 
which overcomes the original “one size fits all” approach: now “qualified investors” are aligned with 
the “professional client” as provided by MiFID (see below). However, securities offers that are 
addressed only to “qualified investors” do not have to be accompanied by a prospectus: this is to 
reduce the costs on the side of the issuers. Moreover, now the intermediaries can use the categorization 
already built for MiFID in order to easily and quickly identify those clients who are “qualified”.242 
Recital 21 of the Prospectus Directive requires that a prospectus has a summary of no more 2,500 
words. Directive 2010/73/EC now requires that the summary convey the so-called “key information”, 
namely those elements which describe “the essential characteristics of, and risks associated with, the 
issuer, any guarantor, and the securities offered or admitted to trading on a regulated market”243. 
Moreover, now the summary must “be drawn up in a common format in order to facilitate 
comparability of the summaries of similar securities”244.   
All this has been done “in order to aid investors when considering whether to invest in [  ] 
securities”245. Leaving apart the emphasis on helping investors understand an offered security, the 
amending directive does not significantly change the 2,500-word content of the summary, so we need 
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to wait for the implementing legislation to see how the final structure and the actual content of the 
summary will be.
246
 
The ex-ante enforcement of the Prospectus Directive is carried out by national regulators. The 
Directive provides that prospectuses are to be approved, in advance of publication, by the competent 
authority of the home Member State. A national regulator’s approval will be deemed granted by a 
“positive act at the outcome of the scrutiny of the completeness of the prospectus by the home 
Member State's competent authority including the consistency of the information given and its 
comprehensibility.”247 While national regulators must verify whether or not the examined prospectus 
complies with the requirements established by the Prospectus Directive, the competent authority’s 
approval does not represent a guarantee that a an investment will be successful. 
The ex-post enforcement of the Prospectus Directive is largely left to domestic tools: “Member States 
shall ensure that their laws, regulation and administrative provisions on civil liability apply to those 
persons responsible for the information given in a prospectus.”248 Moreover, it is stated that “without 
prejudice to the right of Member States to impose criminal sanctions and without prejudice to their 
civil liability regime, Member States shall ensure, in conformity with their national law, that the 
appropriate administrative measures can be taken or administrative sanctions be imposed against the 
persons responsible, where the provisions adopted in the implementation of this Directive have not 
been complied with”.249 However, the Directive does provide quite clear rules concerning persons 
subject to civil liability.
250
  
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)  
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive of the European Parliament and the Council, 
2004/39/EC
251
, amended in 2008 by Directive 2008/10/EC
252
, is probably the most important of the 
implementation steps of the Financial Services Action Plan
253
. Legally speaking, the so-called MiFID 
is based on the “right of establishment” as provided by the Articles of Chapter 2 - Title IV on “free 
movement of persons, services and capital” of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
MiFID replaced the Investment Services Directive (so-called ISD), 93/22/EEC
254
, which had governed 
European investment services market for more than a decade. MiFID is much broader than its 
predecessor, dealing with a wider range of issues and in more depth. However, what it is of most 
importance in our analysis is the shift in the level of harmonization: whereas the ISD envisaged a 
minimum harmonization of national legislation and a mutual recognition mechanism (namely, a 
financial service is regulated by the State where the service takes place, no matter whether the 
provider comes from that State or not); MiFID is built around home country control (a service is 
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regulated by the firm’s home State) and seeks maximum harmonization of contract-related conduct-of-
business rules. 
MiFID was conceived as the cornerstone for the European investment services market and, therefore, 
follows a sector-related vertical legislative approach – in that it regulates one specific sector instead of 
dealing with one aspect crossing several sectors. It officially aims at ensuring a level playing field for 
service providers and, thus, creating a more competitive cross-border financial market
255
, with reduced 
costs for raising capital.
256
 For this reason, indeed, a key aspect of MiFID is the creation of a single 
passport for investment firms which allows them, once authorized by their home country authority, to 
operate throughout the Union. Within this framework, the regulation of the relationship between retail 
investors and investment firms is an important element, even though the protection of the retail private 
investor is “certainly not at the heart of this Directive”.257 
The dominant topic which drives MiFID’s provisions is the existence of an information asymmetry 
between the customer and the service provider, and it tries to solve this problem by shaping contract 
clauses concerning the provision of information from a broker/dealer to a client. In order to do so, 
MiFID provides that an exchange of information between clients (concerning their needs) and 
investment firms (concerning the characteristics of the services offered) should take place even before 
a contract is concluded, at the point of sale and even after it, depending on the nature of the contract. 
All this is designed to improve the client/firm relationship. At the same time, with the intention of 
building a fully-fledged single European retail financial market, MiFID prohibits Member States from 
adopting additional rules for the different national markets, even if they would perhaps be more 
suitable. By the same token, MiFID and its implementing Directive 2006/73
258
 provide new conduct of 
business measures for financial investment services, requiring professionals to receive information 
from their own customers related to their financial knowledge and needs, and thus giving advice that 
better suits their customers’ situation. 
To make all this possible, MiFID relies on the role of law in designing a retail investor fit for a fully-
fledged single European retail financial market
259
, and on public rather than private enforcement 
through business and consumer organizations. This is because, while Article 52 of the MiFID 
constitutes a rather enigmatic provision on collective enforcement and does not give a strong position 
to stakeholders, the role of supervisory administrative bodies is clarified and reinforced by Articles 48-
51. Indeed, MiFID provides a whole range of powers that must be made available to competent 
authorities, including the power to carry out on-site inspections or to adopt any type of measure to 
ensure that investment firms and regulated markets comply with legal requirements.  
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ii. The relationship between financial firms and retail investors and the contract-related rules for the 
provision of investment services  
Categorization of clients 
One of the most important aspects introduced by MiFID in 2004 was the new categorization of clients 
on the basis of their financial knowledge, needs and experience. In Article 11(1) of the Investment 
Services Directive (ISD) it was already envisaged that Member States would draw up rules of conduct 
that must “take account of the professional nature of the person for whom the service is provided.”260 
However, the ISD did not mention any harmonizing rationale to be followed by Member States and 
they were free to implement the provision in many ways.
261
 Conversely, MiFID requires firms to adopt 
efficient written internal policies and procedures to categorize clients.
262
  
MiFID provides for three categories: 
Retail clients:  As noted above, MiFID avoids strictly defining what a retail client is, and it just gives 
a residual account: “Retail client means a client who is not a professional client”.263 However, it is 
clear that retail clients are those who need greater protection and MiFID compels financial firms to 
provide suitable and appropriate services and products to this category. 
Professional clients:  A professional client is a “client who possesses the experience, knowledge and 
expertise to make its own investment decisions and properly assess the risks that it incurs”.264 In 
addition, a professional client needs to meet the criteria listed in Annex II of the Directive. The 
rationale of this category is to reduce the costs borne by financial firms as a result of the expansive 
level of protection granted to retail investors. In order to do so, MiFID lowers the level of protection 
for those customers who already possess the experience and knowledge necessary to understand the 
risk involved in products or services. 
Eligible counterparts: An eligible counterpart is usually an institution or a firm supposed to possess 
knowledge so wide as to exempt an investment firm from the obligations described above. An eligible 
counterpart can be credit institutions, central banks, investment funds, pension funds, national public 
authorities (governments), international organizations, etc. etc. 
As we have already seen in the 2010 directive amending the Prospectus Directive, the categorization 
of customers delineated by MiFID has been used (and is very likely to be used again in the near 
future) as the starting point for a legal evolution which differentiates legal solutions on the basis of 
clients’ characteristics. Moreover, although the MiFID classification is not used, Directive 94/19/EC 
on deposit-guarantee schemes also provides for the differential treatment of bank clients depending on 
their level of sophistication: the rationale of that is the need to avoid a typical moral hazard 
situation
265
. 
However, the UCITS IV Directive still requires a uniform level of investor protection for all 
investment undertakings that raise capital from the public, without considering the level of 
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sophistication of the unit holders and without differentiating between types of investors.
266
 Indeed, the 
term retail investor is used only as a benchmark to measure the clarity of information which has to be 
disclosed.
267
  
Conflict of interests and conduct of business 
Conflicts of interest are a very complex phenomenon
268
 which can be addressed by both organizational 
duties and conduct requirements. The organizational duties aspect falls outside the scope of this paper 
as it concerns the internal structure and the governance configuration of companies. The conduct of 
business, on the other hand, is a key element and is concretized through the following obligations: to 
act fairly, honestly and in the best interests of the investors; to provide fair, clear and not misleading 
information; to give both ex-ante and ex-post contractual information; to use the suitability and 
appropriateness tests when assessing securities; to comply with the best execution rules and other 
measures.
269
  
However, it is worth noting that article 18 of MiFID provides the possibility for firms to adopt internal 
policies in order to identify, prevent, resolve and disclose actual and potential conflicts of interest 
generated in situations within the firm, between the firm and its clients, and amongst its clients when 
providing investment services. Each financial firm needs to have efficient policies which, for instance, 
resolve the problem of internal managers exercising inappropriate influence over the way retail 
advisers recommend securities to their customers. At the moment, this objective seems to be far from 
being achieved.   
Importantly, MiFID provides that if a conflict of interest arises when a service is being sold, the 
provider has to disclose the existence of the conflict: such a communication of the conflict is sufficient 
to discharge the conflict itself. This is contrary to other previous legislation (like the Italian equivalent) 
where the client needed to officially authorize the conflict for it to be overcome.
270
 
Suitability and appropriateness  
The suitability and appropriateness tests were introduced by Article 19(4,5) of MiFID. These features 
originate from the traditional know your merchandise and know your customer rules (see below in the 
US section), and aim to disclose a client’s knowledge and experience, their inclination to risk and their 
financial situation, so that investment firms can assess whether a service is suitable and appropriate for 
their customers.  
The suitability test applies to both retail and professional clients as well as to discretionary portfolio 
management and investment advisory services. The suitability test has been conceived as a tool for 
providers to obtain all the necessary information in order to assess the clients’ financial knowledge 
and expertise, their financial situation and goals, so as to recommend investments suitable to the 
clients’ needs. If a customer does not want to reveal specific information or the product requested or 
offered is “inadequate” according to the client’s financial picture, then the investment firm cannot 
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execute the operation: the suitability test can prevent investment products from being offered or 
securities from being inserted into clients’ portfolio.271 
The appropriateness test applies to retail clients and it has to be carried out when providing execution-
only services and reception and transmission of orders, thus it does not concern cases of discretionary 
portfolio management and investment advisory services. The appropriateness test was conceived as a 
tool for providers to request the necessary information about clients’ financial knowledge and 
expertise in the field related to a product requested by the customers themselves, in order to evaluate 
whether the requested product is appropriate or not. However, “the “appropriateness” cannot stop 
banks from executing their clients’ orders”,272 thus the “burden” of the risk entirely rests on the 
customer’s shoulders. 
Disclosure and Information duties 
Information duties have always played a key role in the field of EU consumer protection law and, 
given the potential vulnerability of investors, marketing disclosure is also a core concern for EU retail 
investment policy.
273
  Beyond the suitability and appropriateness tests, MiFID strongly highlights the 
importance of information disclosure during both the pre-trade and post-trade stages. Article 19(2) 
states that “all information, including marketing communications, addressed by the investment firm to 
clients or potential clients shall be fair, clear and not misleading. Marketing communications shall be 
clearly identifiable as such.” Article 19(3) is the key disclosure provision and it states that information 
needs to be provided in a comprehensible form about:  
1. the investment firm itself and its services;  
2. the financial instruments offered and the investment strategies proposed; with appropriate 
guidance on, and warnings of, the risks associated with investments in those instruments or in 
respect of particular investment strategies;  
3. execution venues, costs and associated charges. 
Article 19(3) clarifies that, in this way, customers “are able to understand the nature and risks of the 
investment service and of the specific type of financial instrument that is being offered and, 
consequently, to take investment decisions on an informed basis.”  Finally, it recommends a 
standardized format as the best way to communicate this information. The objective of Article 19(3) 
and (2) is conceiving an informed and empowered investor through the provision of relevant and 
comprehensible information.
274
 This idea is reinforced by Article 19(8), which provides that the client 
must receive adequate reports from the investment firm on the service provided. 
UCITS’ newly conceived “key information document” follows the same parameters, and the idea of a 
standardized prospectus is also driven by the “information disclosure” paradigm. Unlike MiFID, 
whose appropriateness and suitability tests propagate the idea that the best way to protect investors is 
through mandatory disclosure alone, the Prospectus Directive is entirely designed upon the disclosure 
model, so that it can be said that the prospectus disclosure is “the prototype of the disclosure 
paradigm”275: rational investors can read the prospectus and, on basis of that, they are capable of 
choosing one security over another.
276
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It may be argued that a more technical directive, such as the Prospectus Directive, is unlikely to 
include sophisticated tools such as appropriateness and suitability tests. And this is correct. It can also 
be added that the 2010 amendment differentiates between retail investors and qualified investors and it 
is likely to break the “disclosure paradigm”. However, the fact is that the underlying idea can prove to 
be misleading: by reading a prospectus (usually poorly designed and full of technical terms and 
concepts, notwithstanding the “summary” and the “key information” conveyed in it) a retail investor is 
supposed to understand all the content and to be able to make an efficient decision. This justification 
for disclosure is as weak as suggesting that retail investors can choose to invest their savings in a listed 
company after reading its IFRS-standardized
277
 account books. 
Best execution and other measures 
Putting it simply, “best execution” is about investors receiving the most favorable terms available for 
their trades.
278
 Indeed, Art. 21 states that “Member States shall require that investment firms take all 
reasonable steps to obtain, when executing orders, the best possible result for their clients taking into 
account price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or any other 
consideration relevant to the execution of the order. […] Member States shall require investment firms 
to establish and implement an order execution policy to allow them to obtain, for their client orders, 
the best possible result.” Furthermore, Recital 66, 2nd  level Commission Directive 2006/73/EC 
specifies that “An investment firm should apply its execution policy to each client order that it 
executes with a view to obtaining the best possible result for the client in accordance with that 
policy.”279 
So, here we have a couple of key elements necessary to define an “execution” as “best”: all reasonable 
steps [means] through which to achieve the best possible result. The MiFID best execution 
commitment can be described as “an obligation of means”280 and investment firms are required to take 
all reasonable steps in order to obtain the best possible result.
281
 
Three main principles underneath MiFID’s best execution are: 
 an obligation of means to achieve the best net result for the client, by involving factors that 
determine whether or not this best net result has been accomplished;
282
 
 the documentation of a firm’s execution policy that includes the execution venues and the 
documentation of the parameters that justify these choices.
283
 A firm needs to adopt a best 
execution policy and agree with its client on the very nature of this policy; 
 at the request of the client, a firm needs to be able to demonstrate that the execution object of the 
client’s claim has been carried out in accordance with the agreed execution policy and that the 
execution policy allows the achievement of the best possible result on a consistent basis.
284
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This “best possible result” must include various elements, without emphasizing a specific one285, such 
as account price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or any other 
consideration relevant to the execution of the order.
 286
 All these elements are listed in Art. 21. 
Moreover, European investment firms also consider further criteria such as the categorization of 
clients (either retail or professional), the characteristics of the client order, the type of financial 
instrument chosen, and the transaction costs involved.
287
 CESR has also reaffirmed the importance of 
the total consideration of various factors: “speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, the size and 
nature of the order, market impact and any other implicit transaction costs may be given precedence 
over the immediate price and cost factors “only insofar as they are instrumental in delivering the best 
possible result in terms of the total consideration to the retail client”.” 288 
Other measures which are worth noting are inducements and client order handling. Through the rules 
on inducements, MiFID provides that banks may no longer receive any implicit management fees. 
Finally, the “client order handling” complements “best execution” as regards the quality of the 
services provided, on the basis of the clients’ characteristics 
b. The IOSCO’s Documents and the Issue of Investor Protection289  
IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, Memoranda of Understanding and, to a 
lesser extent, its Codes of Conduct are the core documents of its normative activity. From a formal 
viewpoint, IOSCO standards and principles are not directly binding among the Organization’s 
Members. Moreover, they are deliberately broad, because they aim to ease not so much the 
incorporation of detailed rules, as the assimilation of a specific content. So, it looks as if, on the one 
hand, IOSCO recognize there is “no single prescription or roadmap to good regulation in the field of 
securities”290, while, on the other hand, this roadmap must necessarily lead to a predefined objective. 
The Memoranda of Understanding are the oldest instrument used by IOSCO members. The MOUs 
were originally bilateral and it is only recently that IOSCO began adopting multilateral MOUs.
291
 A 
MOU is a cooperative tool used by the contracting parties in order to facilitate their functional needs 
on specific areas. Due to the extreme flexibility inherent in financial markets since the end of the ‘70s, 
the classical international law tools began to look inadequate, too burdensome and, above all, 
inefficient for the cross-border enforcement of securities laws.
292
  Given this landscape, Memoranda of 
Understanding looked like a very good compromise, able to evade “obstacles and introduce a more 
flexible, lower-profile alternative.” 293  
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The very first bilateral Memoranda of Understanding drafted within IOSCO were signed in the 1980s. 
However, much more recently, a Multilateral Memoranda of Understanding was drafted in order to set 
up “an international benchmark for cross-border co-operation critical to combating violations of 
securities and derivatives law”294. This MMoU was developed by a Special Project Team established 
by IOSCO after the events of September 11th 2001, to set down actions that domestic financial 
authorities could take in order to reinforce cooperation and information sharing.
295
 At the 2005 Annual 
Conference, held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, the Presidents’ Committee decided that, as of January 1st 
2010, the Organization’s ordinary and associate members could apply to become, and be accepted as, 
signatories of the MMoU, or express a formal commitment to seek the legal authority to enable them 
to become MMoU signatories.
296
 The goal of MMoU is to establish a system of information sharing to 
be activated when an investigation is being carried out.
297
 
In 1990, IOSCO adopted the “Report on International Conduct of Business Principles”, one of the first 
documents dealing with fairness, information about customers, information for customers and 
conflicts of interest for the transnational financial markets. In this document, the term fairness is taken 
to encompass an obligation to avoid misleading and deceptive acts of representations.
298
 Particularly 
important is the combination of the Principle of information about customers with the Principle of 
information for customers. The former provides that a firm should seek, and receive, from its 
customers certain information concerning their financial situation, investment experience and 
investment objectives relevant to the services to be provided, and this is perceived as a necessary 
element in enabling the firm to fulfill any suitability requirements.
299
  Such a principle-based rule is 
shaped by the renowned “know your customer” principle.300  
On the other side, the Repot requires a firm to provide timely and accurate reports to the customer 
about business undertaken for or with the customer and to make adequate disclosure of all the relevant 
material information necessary for investors to make informed investment decisions.
301
 In particular, 
the conflict of interest principle envisages that a firm should try to avoid conflicts of interest and, 
when they cannot be avoided, should ensure that its customers are fairly treated.
302
 This principle 
implies that conflicts of interest can be managed, and that proper management to ensure fair treatment 
of customers requires information disclosure, internal rules of confidentiality, or other appropriate 
methods.
303
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In September 1998, IOSCO adopted its “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation”304 (the so-
called IOSCO Principles), which were redrafted in 2003 and revised in 2010 (when 8 principles were 
added)
305
. This document lists 38 principles of securities regulation, which are inevitably general in 
order to be applicable to many different jurisdictions. They represent an attempt to establish what 
IOSCO deems to be the fundamental elements of an effective regulatory system.
306
 The Principles are 
drafted at a broad conceptual level in order to accommodate the differences in the laws, regulatory 
framework, and market structures among its Member jurisdictions.
307
 IOSCO has officially stated that, 
in drafting the Principles, it wanted to “avoid being overly prescriptive in its requirements while, at the 
same time, providing sufficient guidance as to the core elements of an essential regulatory framework 
for securities”.308 
The “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation” are important for three main reasons: they 
establish higher standards of regulation across jurisdictions, improve the depth of cooperation between 
different regulators, and provide a chance to regulate foreign jurisdictions in domestic regulatory 
arrangements.
309
 The “Objectives” follow three main goals:   
 The protection of investors;
310
 
 Ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent;  
 The reduction of systemic risk.  
The document clearly specifies that the 38 principles must be practically implemented into the 
domestic legal framework in order to achieve the goals described above. These 38 principles are 
grouped into nine categories: a) Principles Relating to the Regulator; b) Principles for Self-Regulation; 
c) Principles for the Enforcement of Securities Regulation; d) Principles for Cooperation in 
Regulation; e) Principles for Issuers; f) Principles for Auditors, Credit Rating Agencies, and other 
information providers; g) Principles for Collective Investment Schemes; g) Principles for Market 
Intermediaries; f) Principles for the Secondary Market. 
Full disclosure of that information – which is considered as “material” for investors when making 
investment decisions – is thought to be “the most important means for ensuring investor protection”.311 
Through (enough) information investors are believed to be “better able to assess the potential risks and 
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rewards of their investments and, thus, to protect their own interests”.312 Importantly, Part E, which 
deals with Principles for Issuers, directly mentions both investor protection and accounting and 
auditing standards: these are held to be key components of disclosure requirements and they should be 
of a “high and internationally acceptable quality”.313 
In 2008, the Joint Forum of International Regulators adopted the “Customer suitability in the retail 
sale of financial products and services” document. The document is not a regulatory device, but rather 
a survey of the different national approaches towards customer suitability. Although the document 
highlights the need for a more detailed approach to financial advising, which takes into account the 
customers’ profile and their inclination to risks, there are no really new advancements made in 
regulatory terms. It is worth noting that the Joint Forum of International Regulators recognizes the 
importance of a matter such as customer suitability in the retail sector. However, it does not draft any 
international guidelines, unlike IOSCO’s information disclosure principles. 
c. EU Law and the Soft Incorporation of IOSCO Standards  
The implementation of IOSCO soft-laws is itself soft. This means, for instance, that a principle of the 
“Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation” is not implemented as such, but it shapes the 
content of domestic legislation. This happens, for example, in the case of Principle 16 which states 
that “[t]here should be full, accurate and timely disclosure of financial results, risk and other 
information which is material to investors’ decisions”314 and regarding Principle 10.3 on Timely 
Disclosure of Information,
315
 stating that “[i]nvestors should be provided with the information 
necessary to make informed investment decisions on an ongoing basis.”316  
The principle of full, timely and accurate disclosure of current and reliable information material to 
investment decisions is directly related to the objectives of investor protection and “fair, efficient and 
transparent markets”.317 Many other documents issued by IOSCO stress the importance of disclosure: 
IOSCO Technical Committee, “Public Document No. 16, International Equity Offers - Changes in 
Regulation Since April 1990”, September 1991;  IOSCO Technical Committee, “Public Document 
No. 38, International Equity Offers - Changes in Regulation Since April 1992”, October 1994; 
IOSCO, “IOSCO Resolution No. 44: Resolution on IASC Standards”, May 2000; IOSCO Technical 
Committee, “IOSCO Public Document No. 141, General Principles Regarding Disclosure of 
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations”, February 
2003.
 318
  The importance of full disclosure is incorporated throughout the entire Prospectus Directive, 
in recitals 43 and 88 and art. 19(3) of UCITS, and art. 19 of MiFID. 
However, Article 19 of MiFID also deals with the “know-your-customer” rule and the suitability rule, 
as it regulates the management of clients’ assets. In this vein, Principle 31 also provides that “Market 
intermediaries should be required to establish an internal function that delivers compliance with 
standards for internal organization and operational conduct, with the aim of protecting the interests of 
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clients and their assets and ensuring proper management of risk, through which management of the 
intermediary accepts primary responsibility for these matters”.  
Finally, the same circumstance takes place for Principle 36, which establishes that “Regulation should 
be designed to detect and deter manipulation and other unfair trading practices”, and is incorporated 
into UCITS recital 58, and, again, art. 19 of MiFID; while the same is true for Principle 17 (“Holders 
of securities in a company should be treated in a fair and equitable manner”), which is implemented 
throughout the general terms and conditions of MiFID. 
A similar IOSCO “presence” can be easily found in other pieces of EU legislation like the Directive 
2002/87/EC on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and 
investment firms in a financial conglomerate; or the Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating 
agencies. This approach characterizes the incorporation of IOSCO standards at the domestic level as a 
“soft” approach to implementation: here standards are not directly incorporated as if there were a 
legally binding obligation to do so, but they are implemented particularly because the European 
Commission voluntarily decides to do so – it does that because it thinks these standards are beneficial 
for the European internal financial market. 
Conclusions  
By reading this, the answer to the question “is a greater role for both Europe and IOSCO looming?” 
cannot but be “Yes”. Indeed, IOSCO has been growing exponentially over the last two decades and it 
has become more and more defined, structured and organized. Moving from the old to the new text of 
the By-Laws conveys a more established set of procedures applicable to the body responsible for 
carrying out the Organization’s main policy tasks. Indeed, while the old version did not mention 
anything about the internal procedures of the Technical Committee, the new one provides for some 
procedural rules of the new IOSCO Board. So, generally speaking, the new By-Laws make IOSCO 
look more like a proper international organization even though there is still a long way to go before it 
turns into something fully fledged like the WTO or the IMF.  
As far as the European Union is concerned, it has been playing an increasingly pronounced role in the 
international financial arena and it has done so, not so much as a proper state-like agent, but as a 
hybrid actor, able to progressively replace its (traditional) Member States in the global regulatory 
battlefield where soft-rules are produced. This trend is corroborated by the very recent appointment of 
a senior official of the European Commission as the new IOSCO Secretary General. Thus, even in 
light of the “soft-law leeway” granted by the ECJ case law, it is highly likely that the years to come 
will see the EU assuming a leading international role as regards the production international financial 
standards. 
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